The professed object of the Observations on the corn laws, which
I published in the spring of 1814, was to state with the strictest impartiality the advantages and disadvantages which, in 
the actual circumstances of our present situation, were likely to 
attend the measures under consideration, respecting the trade in 
corn. 
    
     A fair review of both sides of the question, without any 
attempt to conceal the peculiar evils, whether temporary or 
permanent, which might belong to each, appeared to me of use, not 
only to assist in forming an enlightened decision on the subject, 
but particularly to prepare the public for the specific 
consequences which were to be expected from that decision, on 
whatever side it might be made. Such a preparation, from some 
quarter or other, seemed to be necessary, to prevent those just 
discontents which would naturally have arisen, if the measure 
adopted had been attended with results very different from those 
which had been promised by its advocates, or contemplated by the 
legislature. 
    
     With this object in view, it was neither necessary, nor 
desirable, that I should myself express a decided opinion on the 
subject. It would hardly, indeed, have been consistent with that 
character of impartiality, which I wished to give to my 
statements, and in which I have reason to believe I in some 
degree succeeded.(1*) 
    
      These previous statements, however, having been given, and 
having, I hope, shown that the decision, whenever it is made, 
must be a compromise of contending advantages and disadvantages, 
I have no objection now to state (without the least reserve), and 
I can truly say, wit the most complete freedom from all 
interested motives, the grounds of a deliberate, yet decided, 
opinion in favour of some restrictions on the importation of 
foreign corn. 
    
     This opinion has been formed, as I wished the readers of the 
Observations to form their opinions, by looking fairly at the 
difficulties on both sides of the question; and without vainly 
expecting to attain unmixed results, determining on which side 
there is the greatest balance of good with the least alloy of 
evil. The grounds on which the opinion so formed rests, are 
partly those which were stated in the Observations, and partly, 
and indeed mainly, some facts which have occurred during the last 
year, and which have given, as I think, a decisive weight to the 
side of restrictions. 
    
     These additional facts are, first, the evidence, which has 
been laid before Parliament, relating to the effects of the 
present prices of corn, together with the experience of the 
present year; secondly, the improved state of our exchanges, and 
the fall in the price of bullion; and thirdly, and mainly, the 
actual laws respecting the exportation of corn lately passed in 
France. 
    
     1. In the Observations on the corn laws, I endeavoured to 
show that, according to the general principles of supply and 
demand, a considerable fall in the price of corn could not take 
place, without throwing much poor lad out of cultivation, and 
effectually preventing, for a considerable time, all further 
improvements in agriculture, which have for their object an 
increase of produce. 
    
     The general principles, on which I calculated upon these 
consequences, have been fully confirmed by the evidence brought 
before the two houses of Parliament; and the effects of a 
considerable fall in the price of corn, and of the expected 
continuance of low prices, have shown themselves in a very severe 
shock to the cultivation of the country and a great loss of 
agricultural capital. 
    
     Whatever may be said of the peculiar interests and natural 
partialities of those who were called upon to give evidence upon 
this occasion, it is impossible not to be convinced, by the whole 
body of it taken together, that, during the last twenty years, 
and particularly during the last seven, there has been a great 
increase of capital laid out upon the land, and a great 
consequent extension of cultivation and improvement; that the 
system of spirited improvement and high farming, as it is 
technically called, has been principally encouraged by the 
progressive rise of prices owing in a considerable degree, to the 
difficulties thrown in the way of importation of foreign corn by 
the war; that the rapid accumulation of capital on the land, 
which it had occasioned, had so increased our home growth of 
corn, that, notwithstanding a great increase of population, we 
had become much less dependent upon foreign supplies for our 
support; and that the land was still deficient in capital, and 
would admit of the employment of such an addition to its present 
amount, as would be competent to the full supply of a greatly 
increased population: but that the fall of prices, which had 
lately taken place, and the alarm of a still further fall, from 
continued importation, had not only checked all progress of 
improvement, but had already occasioned a considerable loss of 
agricultural advances; and that a continuation of low prices 
would, in spite of a diminution of rents, unquestionably destroy 
a great mass of farming capital all over the country, and 
essentially diminish its cultivation and produce. 
    
     It has been sometimes said, that the losses at present 
sustained by farmers are merely the natural and necessary 
consequences of overtrading, and that they must bear them as all 
other merchants do, who have entered into unsuccessful 
speculations. But surely the question is not, or at least ought 
not to be, about the losses and profits of farmers, and the 
present condition of landholders compared with the past. It may 
be necessary, perhaps, to make inquiries of this kind, with a 
view to ulterior objects; but the real question respects the 
great loss of national wealth, attributed to a change in the 
spirit of our legislative enactments relating to the admission of 
foreign corn. 
    
     We have certainly no right to accuse our farmers of rash 
speculation for employing so large a capital in agriculture. The 
peace, it must be allowed, was most unexpected; and if the war 
had continued, the actual quantity of capital applied to the 
land, might have been as necessary to save the country from 
extreme want in future, as it obviously was in 1812, when, with 
the price of corn at above six guineas a quarter, we could only 
import a little more than 100,000 quarters. If, from the very 
great extension of cultivation, during the four or five preceding 
years, we had not obtained a very great increase of average 
produce, the distresses of that year would have assumed a most 
serious aspect. 
    
     There is certainly no one cause which can affect mercantile 
concerns, at all comparable in the extent of its effects, to the 
cause now operating upon agricultural capital. Individual losses 
must have the same distressing consequences in both cases, and 
they are often more complete, and the fall is greater, in the 
shocks of commerce. But I doubt, whether in the most extensive 
mercantile distress that ever took in this country, there was 
ever one fourth of the property, or one tenth of the number of 
individuals concerned, when compared with the effects of the 
present rapid fall of raw produce, combined with the very scanty 
crop of last year.(2*) 
    
     Individual losses of course become national, according as 
they affect a greater mass of the national capital, and a greater 
number of individuals; and I think it must be allowed further, 
that no loss, in proportion to its amount, affects the interest 
of the nation so deeply, and vitally, and is so difficult to 
recover, as the loss of agricultural capital and produce. 
    
     If it be the intention of the legislature fairly to look at 
the evils, as well as the good, which belongs to both sides of 
the question, it must be allowed, that the evidence laid before 
the two houses of Parliament, and still more particularly the 
experience of the last year, show, that the immediate evils which 
are capable of being remedied by a system of restrictions, are of 
no inconsiderable magnitude. 
    
     2. In the Observations on the corn laws, I gave, as a reason 
for some delay in coming to a final regulation respecting the 
price at which foreign corn might be imported, the very uncertain 
state of the currency. I observed, that three different 
importation prices would be necessary, according as our currency 
should either rise to the then price of bullion, should continue 
at the same nominal value, or should take an intermediate 
position, founded on a fall in the value of bullion, owing to the 
discontinuance of an extraordinary demand for it, and a rise in 
the value of paper, owing to the prospect of a return to payments 
in specie. In the course of this last year, the state of our 
exchanges, and the fall in the price of bullion, show pretty 
clearly, that the intermediate alteration which, I then 
contemplated, greater than in the case first mentioned, and less 
than in the second, is the one which might be adopted with a fair 
prospect of permanence; and that we should not now proceed under 
the same uncertainty respecting the currency, which we should 
have done, if we had adopted a final regulation in the early part 
of last year.(3*) This intermediate alteration, however, supposes 
a rise in the value of paper on a return to cash payments, and 
some general fall of prices quite unconnected with any 
regulations respecting the corn trade.(4*) 
    
     But, if some fall of prices must take place from this cause, 
and if such a fall can never take place without a considerable 
check to industry, and discouragement to the accumulation of 
capital, it certainly does not seem a well-chosen time for the 
legislature to occasion another fall still greater, by departing 
at once from a system of restrictions which it had pursued with 
steadiness during the greatest part of the last century and, 
after having given up for a short period, had adopted again as 
its final policy in its two last enactments respecting the trade 
in corn. Even if it be intended. Finally, to throw open our 
ports, it might be wise to pass some temporary regulations, in 
order to prevent the very great shock which must take place, if 
the two causes here noticed, of the depreciation of commodities, 
be allowed to produce their full effect by contemporaneous 
action. 
    
     3. I stated, in the Observations on the corn laws, that the 
cheapness and steadiness in the price of corn, which were 
promised by the advocates of restrictions, were not attainable by 
the measures they proposed; that it was really impossible for us 
to grow at home a sufficiency for our own consumption, without 
keeping up the price of corn considerably above the average of 
the rest of Europe; and that, while this was the case, as we 
could never export to any advantage, we should always be liable 
to the variations of price, occasioned by the glut of a 
superabundant harvest; in short, that it must be allowed that a 
free trade in corn would, in all ordinary cases, not only secure 
a cheaper, but a more steady, supply of grain. 
    
     In expressing this distinct opinion on the effects of a free 
trade in corn, I certainly meant to refer to a trade really free 
- that is, a trade by which a nation would be entitled to its 
share of the produce of the commercial world, according to its 
means of purchasing, whether that produce were plentiful or 
scanty. In this sense I adhere strictly to the opinion I then 
gave; but, since that period, an event has occurred which has 
shown, in the clearest manner, that it is entirely out of our 
power, even in time of peace, to obtain a free trade in corn, or 
an approximation towards it, whatever may be our wishes on the 
subject. 
    
     It has, perhaps, not been sufficiently attended to in 
general, when the advantages of a free trade in corn have been 
discussed, that the jealousies and fears of nations, respecting 
their means of subsistence, will very rarely allow of a free 
egress of corn, when it is in any degree scarce. Our own 
statutes, till the very last year, prove these fears with regard 
to ourselves; and regulations of the same tendency occasionally 
come in aid of popular clamour in almost all countries of Europe. 
But the laws respecting the exportation of corn, which have been 
passed in France during the last year, have brought this subject 
home to us in the most striking and impressive manner. Our 
nearest neighbour, possessed of the largest and finest corn 
country in Europe, and who, owing to a more favourable climate 
and soil, a more stationary and comparatively less crowded 
population, and a lighter weight of taxation, can grow corn at 
less than half our prices, has enacted, that the exportation of 
corn shall be free till the price rises to about forty nine 
shillings a quarter,(5*) and that then it shall be entirely 
cease.(6*) 
    
     From the vicinity of France, and the cheapness of its corn in 
all years of common abundance, it is scarcely possible that our 
main imports should not come from that quarter as long as our 
ports are open to receive them. In this first year of open trade, 
our imports have been such, as to show, that though the corn of 
the Baltic cannot seriously depress our prices in an unfavourable 
season at home, the corn of France may make it fall below a 
growing price, under the pressure of one of the worst crops that 
has been known for a long series of years. 
    
     I have at present before me an extract from a Rouen paper, 
containing the prices of corn in fourteen different markets for 
the first week in October, the average of which appears to be 
about thirty eight shillings a quarter;(7*) and this was after 
disturbances had taken place both at Havre and Dieppe, on account 
of the quantity exported, and the rise of prices which it had 
occasioned. 
    
     It may be said, perhaps, that the last harvest of France has 
been a very favourable one, and affords no just criterion of its 
general prices. But, from all that I hear, prices have often been 
as low during the last ten years. And, an average not exceeding 
forty shillings a quarter may, I think, be conclusively inferred 
from the price at which exportation is by law to cease. 
    
     At a time when, according to Adam Smith, the growing price in 
this country was only twenty eight shillings a quarter, and the 
average price, including years of scarcity, only thirty three 
shillings, exportation was not prohibited till the price rose to 
forty eight shillings. It was the intention of the English 
government, at that time, to encourage agriculture by giving vent 
to its produce. We may presume that the same motive influenced 
the government of France in the late act respecting exportation. 
And it is fair therefore to conclude, that the price of wheat, in 
common years, is considerably less than the price at which 
exportation is to cease. 
    
     With these prices so near us, and with the consequent power 
of supplying ourselves with great comparative rapidity, which in 
the corn trade is a point of the greatest importance, there can 
be no doubt that, if our ports were open, our principal supplies 
of grain would come from France; and that, in all years of common 
plenty in that country, we should import more largely from it 
than from the Baltic. But from this quarter, which would then 
become our main and most habitual source of supply, all 
assistance would be at once cut off, in every season of only 
moderate scarcity; and we should have to look to other quarters, 
from which it is an established fact, that large sudden supplies 
cannot be obtained, not only for our usual imports, and the 
natural variations which belong to them, but for those which had 
been suddenly cut off from France, and which our habitually 
deficient growth had now rendered absolutely necessary. 
    
     To open our ports, under these circumstances, is not to 
obtain a free trade in corn; and, while I should say, without 
hesitation, that a free trade in corn was calculated to produce 
steadier prices than the system of restrictions with which it has 
been compared, I should, with as little hesitation say, that such 
a trade in corn, as has been described, would be subject to much 
more distressing and cruel variations, than the most determined 
system of prohibitions. 
    
     Such a species of commerce in grain shakes the foundations, 
and alters entirely the data on which the general principles of 
free trade are established. For what do these principles say? 
They say, and say most justly, that if every nation were to 
devote itself particularly to those kinds of industry and 
produce, to which its soil, climate, situation, capital, and 
skill, were best suited; and were then freely to exchange these 
products with each other, it would be the most certain and 
efficacious mode, not only. of advancing the wealth and 
prosperity of the whole body of the commercial republic with the 
quickest pace, but of giving to each individual nation of the 
body the full and perfect use of all its resources. 
    
     I am very far indeed from meaning to insinuate, that if we 
cannot have the most perfect freedom of trade, we should have 
none; or that a great nation must immediately alter its 
commercial policy, whenever any of the countries with which it 
deals passes laws inconsistent with the principles of freedom. 
But I protest most entirely against the doctrine, that we are to 
pursue our general principles without ever looking to see if they 
are applicable to the case before us; and that in politics and 
political economy, we are to go straight forward, as we certainly 
ought to do in morals, without any reference to the conduct and 
proceedings of others. 
    
     There is no person in the least acquainted with political 
economy, but must be aware that the advantages resulting from the 
division of labour, as applicable to nations as well as 
individuals, depend solely and entirely on the power of 
exchanging subsequently the products of labour. And no one can 
hesitate to allow, that it is completely in the power of others 
to prevent such exchanges, and to destroy entirely the advantages 
which would otherwise result from the application of individual 
or national industry, to peculiar and appropriate products. 
    
     Let us suppose, for instance, that the inhabitants of the 
Lowlands of Scotland were to say to the Highlanders, 'We will 
exchange our corn for your cattle, whenever we have a 
superfluity; but if our crops in any degree fail, you must not 
expect to have a single grain': would not the question respecting 
the policy of the present change, which is taking place in the 
Highlands, rest entirely upon different grounds? Would it not be 
perfectly senseless in the Highlanders to think only of those 
general principles which direct them to employ the soil in the 
way that is best suited to it? If supplies of corn could not be 
obtained with some degree of steadiness and certainty from other 
quarters, would it not be absolutely necessary for them to grow 
it themselves, however ill adapted to it might be their soil and 
climate? 
    
     The same may be said of all the pasture districts of Great 
Britain, compared with the surrounding corn countries. If they 
could only obtain the superfluities of their neighbours, and were 
entitled to no share of the produce when it was scarce, they 
could not certainly devote themselves with any degree of safety 
to their present occupations. 
    
     There is, on this account, a grand difference between the 
freedom of the home trade in corn, and the freedom of the foreign 
trade. A government of tolerable vigour can make the home trade 
in corn really free. It can secure to the pasture districts, or 
the towns that must be fed from a distance, their share of the 
general produce, whether plentiful or scarce. It can set them 
quite at rest about the power of exchanging the peculiar products 
of their own labour for the other products which are necessary to 
them, and can dispense, therefore, to all its subjects, the 
inestimable advantages of an unrestricted intercourse. 
    
     But it is not in the power of any single nation to secure the 
freedom of the foreign trade in corn. To accomplish this, the 
concurrence of many others is necessary; and this concurrence, 
the fears and jealousies so universally prevalent about the means 
of subsistence, almost invariably prevent. There is hardly a 
nation in Europe which does not occasionally exercise the power 
of stopping entirely, or heavily taxing, its exports of grain, if 
prohibitions do not form part of its general code of laws. 
    
     The question then before us is evidently a special, not a 
general one. It is not a question between the advantages of a 
free trade, and a system of restrictions; but between a specific 
system of restrictions formed by ourselves for the purpose of 
rendering us, in average years, nearly independent of foreign 
supplies, and the specific system of restricted importations, 
which alone it is in our power to obtain under the existing laws 
of France, and in the actual state of the other countries of the 
continent.(8*) 
    
     In looking, in the first place, at the resources of the 
country, with a view to an independent supply for an increasing 
population; and comparing subsequently the advantages of the two 
systems abovementioned, without overlooking their disadvantages, 
I have fully made up my mind as to the side on which the balance 
lies; and am decidedly of opinion, that a system of restrictions 
so calculated as to keep us, in average years, nearly independent 
of foreign supplies of corn, will more effectually conduce to the 
wealth and prosperity of the country, and of by far the greatest 
mass of the inhabitants, than the opening of our ports for the 
free admission of foreign corn, in the actual state of Europe. 
    
     Of the resources of Great Britain and Ireland for the further 
growth of corn, by the further application of capital to the 
land, the evidence laid before parliament furnishes the most 
ample testimony. But it is not necessary, for this purpose, to 
recur to evidence that may be considered as partial. All the most 
intelligent works which have been written on agricultural 
subjects of late years, agree in the same statements; and they 
are confirmed beyond a possibility of doubt, when we consider the 
extraordinary improvements, and prodigious increase of produce 
that have taken place latterly in some districts, which, in point 
of natural soil, are not superior to others that are still 
yielding the most scanty and miserable crops. Most of the light 
soils of the kingdom might, with adequate capital and skill, be 
made to equal the improved parts of Norfolk; and the vast tracts 
of clay lands that are yet in a degraded state almost all over 
the kingdom, are susceptible of a degree of improvement, which it 
is by no means easy to fix, but which certainly offers a great 
prospective increase of produce. There is even a chance (but on 
this I will not insist) of a diminution in the real price of 
corn,(9*) owing to the extension of those great improvements, and 
that great economy and good management of labour, of which we 
have such intelligent accounts from Scotland.(10*) If these clay 
lands, by draining, and the plentiful application of lime and 
other manures, could be so far meliorated in quality as to admit 
of being worked by two horses and a single man, instead of three 
or four horses with a man and a boy, what a vast saving of labour 
and expense would at once be effected, at the same time that the 
crops would be prodigiously increased! And such an improvement 
may rationally be expected, from what has really been 
accomplished in particular districts. In short, if merely the 
best modes of cultivation, now in use in some parts of Great 
Britain, were generally extended, and the whole country was 
brought to a level, in proportion to its natural advantages of 
soil and situation, by the further accumulation and more equable 
distribution of capital and skill; the quantity of additional 
produce would be immense, and would afford the means of 
subsistence to a very great increase of population. 
    
     In some countries possessed of a small territory, and 
consisting perhaps chiefly of one or two large cities, it never 
can be made a question, whether or not they should freely import 
foreign corn. They exist, in fact, by this importation; and being 
always, in point of population, inconsiderable, they may, in 
general, rely upon a pretty regular supply. But whether regular 
or not, they have no choice. Nature has clearly told them, that 
if they increase in wealth and power to any extent, it can only 
be by living upon the raw produce of other countries. 
    
     It is quite evident that the same alternative is not 
presented to Great Britain and Ireland, and that the united 
empire has ample means of increasing in wealth, population, and 
power, for a very long course of years, without being habitually 
dependent upon foreign supplies for the means of supporting its 
inhabitants. 
    
     As we have clearly, therefore, our choice between two 
systems, under either of which we may certainly look forwards to 
a progressive increase of population and power; it remains for us 
to consider in which way the greatest portion of wealth and 
happiness may be steadily secured to the largest mass of the 
people. 
    
     1. And first let us look to the labouring classes of society, 
as the foundation on which the whole fabric rests; and, from 
their numbers, unquestionably of the greatest weight, in any 
estimate of national happiness. 
    
     If I were convinced, that to open our ports, would be 
permanently to improve the condition of the labouring classes of 
society, I should consider the question as at once determined in 
favour of such a measure. But I own it appears to me, after the 
most deliberate attention to the subject, that it will be 
attended with effects very different from those of improvement. 
We are very apt to be deceived by names, and to be captivated 
with the idea of cheapness, without reflecting that the term is 
merely relative, and that it is very possible for a people to be 
miserably poor, and some of them starving, in a country where the 
money price of corn is very low. Of this the histories of Europe 
and Asia will afford abundant instances. 
    
     In considering the condition of the lower classes of society, 
we must consider only the real exchangeable value of labour; that 
is, its power of commanding the necessaries, conveniences, and 
luxuries of life. 
    
     I stated in the Observations, and more at large in the 
Inquiry into rents,(11*) that under the same demand for labour, 
and the same consequent power of purchasing the means of 
subsistence, a high money price of corn would give the labourer a 
very great advantage in the purchase of the conveniences and 
luxuries of life. The effect of this high money price would not, 
of course, be so marked among the very poorest of the society, 
and those who had the largest families; because so very great a 
part of their earnings must be employed in absolute necessaries. 
But to all those above the very poorest, the advantage of wages 
resulting from a price of eighty shillings a quarter for wheat, 
compared with fifty or sixty, would in the purchase of tea, 
sugar, cotton, linens, soap, candles, and many other articles, be 
such as to make their condition decidedly superior. 
    
     Nothing could counterbalance this, but a much greater demand 
for labour; and such an increased demand, in consequence of the 
opening of our ports, is at best problematical. The check to 
cultivation has been so sudden and decisive, as already to throw 
a great number of agricultural labourers out of employment;(12*) 
and in Ireland this effect has taken place to such a degree, as 
to threaten the most distressing, and even alarming, 
consequences. The farmers, in some districts, have entirely lost 
the little capital they possessed; and, unable to continue in 
their farms, have deserted them, and left their labourers without 
the means of employment. In a country, the peculiar defects of 
which were already a deficiency of capital, and a redundancy of 
population, such a check to the means of employing labour must be 
attended with no common distress. In Ireland, it is quite 
certain, that there are no mercantile capitals ready to take up 
those persons who are thus thrown out of work, and even in Great 
Britain the transfer will be slow and difficult. 
    
     Our commerce and manufactures, therefore, must increase very 
considerably before they can restore the demand for labour 
already lost; for the and a moderate increase beyond this will 
scarcely make up disadvantage of a low money price of wages. 
    
     These wages will finally be determined by the usual money 
price of corn, and the state of the demand for labour. 
    
     There is a difference between what may be called the usual 
price of corn and the average price, which has not been 
sufficiently attended to. Let us suppose the common price of 
corn, for four years out of five, to be about £2 a quarter, and 
during the fifth year to be £6. The average price of the five 
years will then be £2. 16s.; but the usual price will still be 
about £2, and it is by this price, and not by the price of a year 
of scarcity, or even the average including it, that wages are 
generally regulated. 
    
     If the ports were open, the usual price of corn would 
certainly fall, and probably the average price; but from at has 
before been said of the existing laws of France, and of the 
practice among the Baltic nations of raising the tax on their 
exported corn in proportion to the demand for it, there is every 
reason to believe, that the fluctuations of price would be much 
greater. Such would, at least, be my conclusion from theory; and, 
I think, it has been confirmed by the experience of the last 
hundred years. During this time, the period of our greatest 
importations, and of our greatest dependence upon foreign corn, 
was from 1792 to 1805 inclusive; and certainly in no fourteen 
years of the whole hundred were the fluctuations of price so 
great. In 1792 the price was 42s. a quarter; in 1796, 77s.; in 
1801, 118s. a quarter; and, in 1803, 56s. Between the year 1792 
and 1801 the rise was almost a triple, and in the short period 
from 1798 to 1803, it rose from 50s. to 118s. and fell again to 
56s.(13*) 
    
     I would not insist upon this existence as absolutely 
conclusive, on account of the mixture of accident in all such 
appeals to facts; but it certainly tends to confirm the 
probability of those great fluctuations which, according to all 
general principles, I should expect from the temper and customs 
of nations, with regard to the egress of corn, when it is scarce; 
and particularly from the existing laws of that country, which, 
in all common years, will furnish us with a large proportion of 
our supplies. 
    
     To these causes of temporary fluctuations, during peace, 
should be added the more durable as well as temporary, 
fluctuations occasioned by war. Without reference to the danger 
of excessive scarcity from another combination against us, if we 
are merely driven back at certain distant intervals upon our own 
resources, the experience of the present times will teach us not 
to estimate lightly the convulsion which attends the return, and 
the evils of such alternations of price. 
    
     In the Observations, I mentioned some causes of fluctuations 
which would attend the system of restrictions; but they are in my 
opinion inconsiderable, compared with those which have been just 
referred to. 
    
     On the labouring classes, therefore, the effects of opening 
our ports for the free importation of foreign corn, will be 
greatly to lower their wages, and to subject them to much greater 
fluctuations of price. And, in this state of things, it will 
require a much greater increase in the demand for labour, than 
there is in any rational ground for expecting, to compensate to 
the labourer the advantages which he loses in the high money 
wages of labour, and the steadier and less fluctuating price of 
corn. 
    
     2. Of the next most important class of society, those who 
live upon the profits of stock, one half probably are farmers, or 
immediately connected with farmers; and of the property of the 
other half, not above one fourth is engaged in foreign trade. 
    
     Of the farmers it is needless to say anything. It cannot be 
doubted that they will suffer severely from the opening of the 
ports. Not that the profits of farming will not recover 
themselves, after a certain period, and be as great, or perhaps 
greater, than they were before; but this cannot take place till 
after a great loss of agricultural capital, or the removal of it 
into the channels of commerce and manufactures. 
    
     Of the commercial and manufacturing part of the society, only 
those who are directly engaged in foreign trade, will feel the 
benefit of the importing system. It is of course to be expected, 
that the foreign trade of the nation will increase considerably. 
If it do not, indeed, we shall have experienced a very severe 
loss, without anything like a compensation for it. And if this 
increase merely equals the loss of produce sustained by 
agriculture, the quantity of other produce remaining the same, it 
is quite clear that the country cannot possibly gain by the 
exchange, at whatever price it may buy or sell. Wealth does not 
consist in the dearness or cheapness of the usual measure of 
value, but in the quantity of produce; and to increase 
effectively this quantity of produce, after the severe check 
sustained by agriculture, it is necessary that commerce should 
make a very powerful start. 
    
     In the actual state of Europe and the prevailing jealousy of 
our manufactures, such a start seems quite doubtful; and it is by 
no means impossible that we shall be obliged to pay for our 
foreign corn, by importing less of other commodities, as well as 
by exporting more of our manufactures. 
    
     It may be said, perhaps, that a fall in the price of our corn 
and labour, affords the only chance to our manufacturers of 
retaining possession of the foreign markets; and that though the 
produce of the country may not be increased by the fall in the 
price of corn, such a fall is necessary to prevent a positive 
diminution of it. There is some weight undoubtedly in this 
argument. But if we look at the probable effects of returning 
peace to Europe, it is impossible to suppose that, even with a 
considerable diminution in the price of labour, we should not 
lose some markets on the continent, for those manufactures in 
which we have no peculiar advantage; while we have every reason 
to believe that in others, where our colonies, our navigation, 
our long credits, our coals, and our mines come in question, as 
well as our skill and capital, we shall retain our trade in spite 
of high wages. Under these circumstances, it seems peculiarly 
advisable to maintain unimpaired, if possible, the home market, 
and not to lose the demand occasioned by so much of the rents of 
land, and of the profits and capital of farmers, as must 
necessarily be destroyed by the check to our home produce. 
    
     But in whatever way the country may be affected by the 
change, we must suppose that those who are immediately engaged in 
foreign trade will benefit by it. As those, however, form but a 
very small portion of the class of persons living on the profits 
of stock, in point of number, and not probably above a seventh or 
eighth in point of property, their interests cannot be allowed to 
weigh against the interests of so very large a majority. 
    
     With regard to this great majority, it is impossible that 
they should not feel very widely and severely the diminution of 
their nominal capital by the fall of prices. We know the magic 
effect upon industry of a rise of prices. It has been noticed by 
Hume, and witnessed by every person who has attended to subjects 
of this kind. And the effects of a fall are proportionately 
depressing. Even the foreign trade will not escape its influence, 
though here it may be counterbalanced by a real increase of 
demand. But, in the internal trade, not only will the full effect 
of this deadening weight be experienced, but there is reason to 
fear that it may be accompanied with an actual diminution of home 
demand. There may be the same or even a greater quantity of corn 
consumed in the country, but a smaller quantity of manufactures 
and colonial produce; and our foreign corn may be purchased in 
part by commodities which were before consumed at home. In this 
case, the whole of the internal trade must severely suffer, and 
the wealth and enjoyments of the country be decidedly diminished. 
The quantity of a country's exports is a very uncertain criterion 
of its wealth. The quantity of produce permanently consumed at 
home is, perhaps, the most certain criterion of wealth to which 
we can refer. 
    
     Already, in all the country towns, this diminution of demand 
has been felt in a very great degree; and the surrounding 
farmers, who chiefly support them, are quite unable to make their 
accustomed purchases. If the home produce of grain be 
considerably diminished by the opening of our ports, of which 
there can be no doubt, these effects in the agricultural 
countries must be permanent, though not to the same extent as at 
present. And even if the manufacturing towns should ultimately 
increase, in proportion to the losses of the country, of which 
there is great reason to doubt, the transfer of wealth and 
population will be slow, painful, and unfavourable to happiness. 
    
     3. Of the class of landholders, it may be truly said, that 
though they do not so actively contribute to the production of 
wealth, as either of the classes just noticed, there is no class 
in society whose interests are more nearly and intimately 
connected with the prosperity of the state. 
    
     Some persons have been of opinion, and Adam Smith himself 
among others, that a rise or fall of the price of corn does not 
really affect the interests of the landholders; but both theory 
and experience prove the contrary; and show, that, under all 
common circumstances, a fall of price must be attended with a 
diminution of produce, and that a diminution of produce will 
naturally be attended with a diminution of rent.(14*) 
    
     Of the effect, therefore, of opening the ports, in 
diminishing both the real and nominal rents of the landlords, 
there can be no doubt; and we must not imagine that the interest 
of a body of men, so circumstanced as the landlords, can 
materially suffer without affecting the interests of the state. 
    
     It has been justly observed by Adam Smith, that 'no equal 
quantity of productive labour employed in manufactures can ever 
occasion so great a reproduction as in agriculture.' If we 
suppose the rents of land taken throughout the kingdom to be one 
fourth of the gross produce, it is evident, that to purchase the 
same value of raw produce by means of manufactures, would require 
one third more capital. Every five thousand pounds laid out on 
the land, not only repays the usual profits of stock, but 
generates an additional value, which goes to the landlord. And 
this additional value is not a mere benefit to a particular 
individual, or set of individuals, but affords the most steady 
home demand for the manufactures of the country, the most 
effective fund for its financial support, and the largest 
disposable force for its army and navy. It is true, that the last 
additions to the agricultural produce of an improving country are 
not attended with a large proportion of rent;(15*) and it is 
precisely this circumstance that may make it answer to a rich 
country to import some of its corn, if it can be secure of 
obtaining an equable supply. But in all cases the importation of 
foreign corn must fail to answer nationally, if it is not so much 
cheaper than the corn that can be grown at home, as to equal both 
the profits and the rent of the grain which it displaces. 
    
     If two capitals of ten thousand pounds each, be employed, one 
in manufactures, and the other in the improvement of the land, 
with the usual profits, and witHdrawn in twenty years, the one 
employed in manufactures will leave nothing behind it, while the 
one employed on the land will probably leave a rent of no 
inconsiderable value. 
    
     These considerations, which are not often attended to, if 
they do not affect the ordinary question of a free trade in corn, 
must at least be allowed to have weight, when the policy of such 
a trade is, from peculiarity of situation and circumstances, 
rendered doubtful. 
    
     4. We now come to a class of society, who will unquestionably 
be benefited by the opening of our ports. These are the 
stockholders, and tHose who live upon fixed salaries.(16*) They 
are not only, however, small in number, compared with those who 
will be affected in a different manner; but their interests are 
not so closely interwoven with the welfare of the state, as the 
classes already considered, particularly the labouring classes, 
and the landlords. 
    
     In the Observations, I remarked, that it was 'an error of the 
most serious magnitude to suppose that any natural or artificial 
causes, which should raise or lower the values of corn or silver, 
might be considered as matters of indifference; and that, 
practically, no material change could take place in the value of 
either, without producing both temporary and lasting effects, 
which have a most powerful influence on the distribution of 
property.' 
    
     In fact, it is perfectly impossible to suppose that, in any 
change in the measure of value, which ever did, or ever can take 
place practically, all articles, both foreign and domestic, and 
all incomes, from whatever source derived, should arrange 
themselves precisely in the same relative proportions as before. 
And if they do not, it is quite obvious, that such a change may 
occasion the most marked differences in the command possessed by 
individuals and classes of individuals over the produce and 
wealth of the country. Sometimes the changes of this kind that 
actually take place, are favourable to the industrious classes of 
society, and sometimes unfavourable. 
    
     It can scarcely be doubted, that one of the main causes, 
which has enabled us hitherto to support, with almost 
undiminished resources, the prodigious weight of debt which has 
been accumulated during the last twenty years, is the continued 
depreciation of the measure in which it has been estimated, and 
the great stimulus to industry, and power of accumulation, which 
have been given to the industrious classes of society by the 
progressive rise of prices. As far as this was occasioned by 
excessive issues of paper, the stockholder was unjustly treated, 
and the industrious classes of society benefited unfairly at his 
expense. But, on the other hand, if the price of corn were now to 
fall to 50 shillings a quarter, and labour and other commodities 
nearly in proportion, there can be no doubt that the stockholder 
would be benefited unfairly at the expense of the industrious 
classes of society, and consequently at the expense of the wealth 
and prosperity of the whole country. 
    
     During the twenty years, beginning with 1794 and ending with 
1813, the average price of British corn per quarter was about 83 
shillings; during the ten years ending with 1813, 92 shillings; 
and during the last five years of the twenty, 108 shillings. In 
the course of these twenty years, the government borrowed near 
£500 millions of real capital, for which on a rough average, 
exclusive of the sinking fund, it engaged to pay about 5 per 
cent. But if corn should fall to 50 shillings a quarter, and 
other commodities in proportion, instead of an interest of about 
5 per cent the government would really pay an interest of 7, 8, 
9, and for the last £200 millions, 10 per cent. 
    
     To this extraordinary generosity towards the stockholders, I 
should be disposed to make no kind of objection, if it were not 
necessary to consider by whom it is to be paid; and a moment's 
reflection will show us, that it can only be paid by the 
industrious classes of society and the landlords, that is, by all 
those whose nominal incomes will vary with the variations in the 
measure of value. The nominal revenues of this part of the 
society, compared with the average of the last five years, will 
be diminished one half; and out of this nominally reduced income, 
they will have to pay the same nominal amount of taxation. 
    
     The interest and charges of the national debt, including the 
sinking fund, are now little short of £40 millions a year; and 
these £40 millions, if we completely succeed in the reduction of 
the price of corn and labour, are to be paid in future from a 
revenue of about half the nominal value of the national income in 
1813. 
    
     If we consider, with what an increased weight the taxes on 
tea, sugar, malt, leather, soap, candles, etc., etc. would in 
this case bear on the labouring classes of society, and what 
proportion of their incomes all the active, industrious middle 
orders of the state, as well as the higher orders, must pay in 
assessed taxes, and the various articles of the customs and 
excise, the pressure will appear to be absolutely intolerable. 
Nor would even the ad valorem taxes afford any real relief. The 
annual £40 millions, must at all events be paid; and if some 
taxes fail, others must be imposed that will be more productive. 
    
     These are considerations sufficient to alarm even the 
stockholders themselves. indeed, if the measure of value were 
really to fall, as we have supposed, there is great reason to 
fear that the country would be absolutely unable to continue the 
payment of the present interest of the national debt. 
    
     I certainly do not think, that by opening our ports to the 
freest admission of foreign corn, we shall lower the price to 50 
shillings a quarter. I have already given my reasons for 
believing that the fluctuations which in the present state of 
Europe, a system of importation would bring with it, would be 
often producing dear years, and throwing us back again upon our 
internal resources. But still there is no doubt whatever, that a 
free influx of foreign grain would in all commonly favourable 
seasons very much lower its price. 
    
     Let us suppose it lowered to 60 shillings a quarter, which 
for periods of three or four years together is not improbable. 
The difference between a measure of value at 60 compared with 80 
(the price at which it is proposed to fix the importation), is 33 
1/3 per cent. This percentage upon £40 millions amounts to a very 
formidable sum. But let us suppose that corn does not effectually 
regulate the prices of other commodities; and, making allowances 
on this account, let us take only 25, or even 20 per cent. Twenty 
per cent upon £40 millions amounts at once to £8 millions - a sum 
which ought to go a considerable way towards a peace 
establishment; but which, in the present case, must go to pay the 
additional interest of the national debt, occasioned by the 
change in the measure of value. And even if the price of corn be 
kept up by restrictions to 80 shillings a quarter, it is certain 
that the whole of the loans made during the war just terminated, 
will on an average, be paid at an interest very much higher than 
they were contracted for; which increased interest can, of 
course, only be furnished by the industrious classes of society. 
    
     I own it appears to me that the necessary effect of a change 
in the measure of value on the weight of a large national debt is 
alone sufficient to make the question fundamentally different 
from that of a simple question about a free or restricted trade; 
and, that to consider it merely in this light, and to draw our 
conclusions accordingly, is to expect the same results from 
premises which have essentially changed their nature. From this 
review of the manner in which the different classes of society 
will be affected by the opening of our ports, I think it appears 
clearly, that very much the largest mass of the people, and 
particularly of the industrious orders of the state, will be more 
injured than benefited by the measure. 
    
     I have now stated the grounds on which it appears to me to be 
wise and politic, in the actual circumstances of the country, to 
restrain the free importation of foreign corn. 
    
     To put some stop to the progressive loss of agricultural 
capital, which is now taking place, and which it will be by no 
means easy to recover, it might be advisable to pass a temporary 
act of restriction, whatever may be the intention of the 
legislature in future. But, certainly it is much to be wished 
that as soon as possible, consistently with due deliberation, the 
permanent policy intended to be adopted with regard to the trade 
in corn should be finally settled. Already, in the course of 
little more than a century, three distinct changes in this policy 
have taken place. The act of William, which gave the bounty, 
combined with the prohibitory act of Charles II was founded 
obviously and strikingly upon the principle of encouraging 
exportation and discouraging importation; the spirit of the 
regulations adopted in 1773, and acted upon some time before, was 
nearly the reverse, and encouraged importation and discouraged 
exportation. Subsequently, as if alarmed at the dependence of the 
country upon foreign corn, and the fluctuations of price which it 
had occasioned, the legislature in a feeble act of 1791, and 
rather a more effective one in 1804, returned again to the policy 
of restrictions. And if the act of 1804 be left now unaltered, it 
may be fairly said that a fourth change has taken place; as it is 
quite certain that, to proceed consistently upon a restrictive 
system, fresh regulations become absolutely necessary to keep 
pace with the progressive fall in the value of currency. 
    
     Such changes in the spirit of our legislative enactments are 
much to be deprecated; and with a view to a greater degree of 
steadiness in future, it is quite necessary that we should be so 
fully prepared for the consequences which belong to each system, 
as not to have our determinations shaken by them, when they 
occur. 
    
     If, upon mature deliberation, we determine to open our ports 
to the free admission of foreign grain, we must not be disturbed 
at the depressed state, and diminished produce of our home 
cultivation; we must not be disturbed at our becoming more and 
more dependent upon other nations for the main support of our 
population; we must not be disturbed at the greatly increased 
pressure of the national debt upon the national industry; and we 
must not be disturbed at the fluctuations of price, occasioned by 
the very variable supplies, which we shall necessarily receive 
from France, in the actual state of her laws, or by the 
difficulty and expense of procuring large, and sudden imports 
from the Baltic, when our wants are pressing. These consequences 
may all be distinctly foreseen. Upon all general principles, they 
belong to the opening of our ports, in the actual state and 
relations of this country to the other countries of Europe; and 
though they may be counterbalanced or more than counterbalanced, 
by other advantages, they cannot, in the nature of things, be 
avoided. 
    
     On the other hand, if, on mature deliberation, we determine 
steadily to pursue a system of restrictions with regard to the 
trade in corn, we must not be disturbed at a progressive rise in 
the price of grain; we must not be disturbed at the necessity of 
altering, at certain intervals, our restrictive laws according to 
the state of the currency, and the value of the precious metals; 
we must not be disturbed at the progressive diminution of fixed 
incomes; and we must not be disturbed at the occasional loss or 
diminution of a continental market for some of our least peculiar 
manufactures, owing to the high price of our labour.(17*) All 
these disadvantages may be distinctly foreseen. According to all 
general principles they strictly belong to the system adopted; 
and, though they may be counterbalanced, and more than 
counterbalanced, by other greater advantages, they cannot, in the 
nature of things, be avoided, if we continue to increase in 
wealth and population. 
    
     Those who promise low prices upon the restrictive system, 
take an erroneous view of the causes which determine the prices 
of raw produce, and draw an incorrect inference from the 
experience of the first half of the last century. As I have 
stated in another place,(18*) a nation which very greatly gets 
the start of its neighbours in riches, without any peculiar 
natural facilities for growing corn, must necessarily submit to 
one of these alternatives - either a very high comparative price 
of grain, or a very great dependence upon other countries for it. 
    
     With regard to the specific mode of regulating the 
importation of corn, if the restrictive system be adopted, I am 
not sufficiently acquainted with the details of the subject to be 
able to speak with confidence. It seems to be generally agreed, 
that, in the actual state of things, a price of about eighty 
shillings a quarter(19*) would prevent our cultivation from 
falling back, and perhaps allow it to be progressive. But, in 
future, we should endeavour, if possible, to avoid all 
discussions about the necessity of protecting the British farmer, 
and securing to him a fair living profit. Such language may 
perhaps be allowable in a crisis like the present. But certainly 
the legislature has nothing to do with securing to any classes of 
its subjects a particular rate of profits in their different 
trades. This is not the province of a government; and it is 
unfortunate that any language should be used which may convey 
such an impression, and make people believe that their rulers 
ought to listen to the accounts of their gains and losses. 
    
     But a government may certainly see sufficient reasons for 
wishing to secure an independent supply of grain. This is a 
definite, and may be a desirable, object, of the same nature as 
the Navigation Act; and it is much to be wished, that this 
object, and not the interests of farmers and landlords, should be 
the ostensible, as well as the real, end which we have in view, 
in all our inquiries and proceedings relating to the trade in 
corn. 
    
     I firmly believe that, in the actual state of Europe, and 
under the actual circumstances of our present situation, it is 
our wisest policy to grow our own average supply of corn; and, in 
so doing, I feel persuaded that the country has ample resources 
for a great and continued increase of population, of power, of 
wealth, and of happiness. 

NOTES: 

1. Some of my friends were of different opinions as to the side, 
towards which my arguments most inclined. This I consider as a 
tolerably fair proof of impartiality. 

2. Mercantile losses are always comparatively partial; but the 
present losses, occasioned by the unusual combination of low 
prices, and scanty produce, must inflict a severe blow upon the 
whole mass of cultivators. There never, perhaps, was known a year 
more injurious to the interests of agriculture. 

3. At the same time, I certainly now very much wish that some 
regulation had been adopted last year. It would have saved the 
nation a great loss of agricultural capital, which it will take 
some time to recover. But it was impossible to foresee such a 
year as the present -- such a combination, as a very bad harvest, 
and very low prices. 

4. I have very little doubt that the value of paper in this 
country has already risen, norwithstanding the increased issues 
of the Bank. These increased issues I attribute chiefly to the 
great failures which have taken place among country banks, and 
the very great purchases which have been made for the continental 
markets, and, under these circumstances, increased issues might 
take place, accompanied even by a rise of value. But the currency 
has not yet recovered itself. The real exchange, during the last 
year, must have been greatly in our favour, although the nominal 
exchange is considerably against us. This shows, 
incontrovertibly, that our currency is still depreciated, in 
reference to the bullion currencies of the continent. A part, 
however, of this depreciation may still be owing to the value of 
bullion in Europe not having yet fallen to its former level. 

5. Calculated at twenty four livres the pound sterling. 

6. It has been supposed by some, that this law cannot, and will 
not be executed: but I own I see no grounds for such an opinion. 
It is difficult to execute prohibitions against the exportation 
of corn, when it is in great plenty, but not when it is scarce. 
For ten years before 1757, we had in this country, regularly 
exported on an average, above 400,000 quarters of wheat, and in 
that year there was at once an excess of importation. With regard 
to the alleged impotence of governments in this respect, it 
appears to me that facts show their power rather than their 
weakness. To be convinced of this, it is only necessary to look 
at the diminished importations from America during the war, and 
particularly from the Baltic after Bonaparte's decrees. The 
imports from France and the Baltic in 1810, were by special 
licences, granted for purposes of revenue. Such licences showed 
strength rather than weakness; and might have been refused, if a 
greater object than revenue had at that time presented itself. 

7. The average is 16 francs, 21 centimes, the hectolitre. The 
hectolitre is about 1/20th less than 3 Winchester bushels, which 
makes the English quarter come to about 38 shillings. 

8. It appears from the evidence, that the corn from the Baltic is 
often very heavily taxed, and that this tax is generally raised 
in proportion to our necessities. In a scarce year in this 
country we could never get any considerable quantity of corn from 
the Baltic, without paying an enormous price for it. 

9. By the real growing price of corn I mean the real quantity of 
labour and capital which has been employed to procure the last 
additions which have been made to the national produce. In every 
rich and improving country there is a natural and strong tendency 
to a constantly increasing price of raw produce, owing to the 
necessity of employing, progressively, land of an inferior 
quality. But this tendency may be partially counteracted by great 
improvements in cultivation, and economy of labour. See this 
subject treated in An inquiry into the nature and progress of 
rent, just published. 

10. Sir John Sinclair, An account of the systems of husbandry 
adopted in the more improved districts of Scotland (Edinburgh, 
1812), and General report of the agricultural state and political 
circumstances of Scotland, 4 vols. (Edinburgh, 1814). 

11. Above, pp. 83-109 and 111-45. 

12. I was not prepared to expect (as I intimated in the 
Observations) so sudden a fall in the price of labour as has 
already taken place. This fall has been occasioned, not so much 
by the low price of corn, as by the sudden stagnation of 
agricultural work, occasioned by a more sudden check to 
cultivation than I foresaw. 

13. I am strongly disposed to believe, that it is owning to the 
unwillingness of governments to allow the free egress of their 
corn, when it is scarce, that nations are practically so little 
dependent upon each other for corn, as they are found to be. 
According to all general principles they ought to be more 
dependent. But the great fluctuations in the price of corn, 
occasioned by this unwillingness, tend to throw each country back 
again upon its internal resources. This was remarkably the case 
with us in 1800 and 1801, when the very high price, which we paid 
for foreign corn, gave a prodigious stimulus to our domestic 
agriculture. A large territorial country, that imports foreign 
corn, is exposed not infrequently to the fluctuations which 
belong to this kind of variable dependence, without obtaining the 
cheapness that ought to accompany a trade in corn really free. 

14. See this subject treated in Malthus, Nature and Progress of 
Rent. 

15. Malthus, Nature and progress of rent. 

16. It is to this class of persons that I consider myself as 
chiefly belonging. Much the greatest part of my income is derived 
from a fixed salary and the interest of money in the funds. 

17. It often happens that the high prices of a particular country 
may diminish the quantity of its exports without diminishing the 
value of their amount abroad; in which case its foreign trade is 
peculiarly advantageous, as it purchases the same amount of 
foreign commodities at a much less expense of labour and capital. 

18. Malthus, Nature and progress of rent. 

19. This price seems to be pretty fairly consistent with the idea 
of getting rid of that part of our high prices which belongs to 
excessive issues of paper, and retaining only that part which 
belongs to great wealth, combined with a system of restrictions.