A thousand years ago, a group
of Vikings led by Erik the Red set sail from
Norway for the vast Arctic landmass west of
Scandinavia which came to be known as Greenland.
It was largely uninhabitable—a forbidding
expanse of snow and ice. But along the
southwestern coast there were two deep fjords
protected from the harsh winds and saltwater
spray of the North Atlantic Ocean, and as the
Norse sailed upriver they saw grassy slopes
flowering with buttercups, dandelions, and
bluebells, and thick forests of willow and birch
and alder. Two colonies were formed, three
hundred miles apart, known as the Eastern and
Western Settlements. The Norse raised sheep,
goats, and cattle. They turned the grassy slopes
into pastureland. They hunted seal and caribou.
They built a string of parish churches and a
magnificent cathedral, the remains of which are
still standing. They traded actively with
mainland Europe, and tithed regularly to the
Roman Catholic Church. The Norse colonies in
Greenland were law-abiding, economically viable,
fully integrated communities, numbering at their
peak five thousand people. They lasted for four
hundred and fifty years—and then they
vanished.
The story of the Eastern and Western
Settlements of Greenland is told in Jared
Diamond’s “Collapse: How Societies Choose to
Fail or Succeed” (Viking; $29.95). Diamond
teaches geography at U.C.L.A. and is well known
for his best-seller “Guns, Germs, and Steel,”
which won a Pulitzer Prize. In “Guns, Germs, and
Steel,” Diamond looked at environmental and
structural factors to explain why Western
societies came to dominate the world. In
“Collapse,” he continues that approach, only
this time he looks at history’s losers—like the
Easter Islanders, the Anasazi of the American
Southwest, the Mayans, and the modern-day
Rwandans. We live in an era preoccupied with the
way that ideology and culture and politics and
economics help shape the course of history. But
Diamond isn’t particularly interested in any of
those things—or, at least, he’s interested in
them only insofar as they bear on what to him is
the far more important question, which is a
society’s relationship to its climate and
geography and resources and neighbors.
“Collapse” is a book about the most prosaic
elements of the earth’s ecosystem—soil, trees,
and water—because societies fail, in Diamond’s
view, when they mismanage those environmental
factors.
There was nothing wrong with the social
organization of the Greenland settlements. The
Norse built a functioning reproduction of the
predominant northern-European civic model of the
time—devout, structured, and reasonably orderly.
In 1408, right before the end, records from the
Eastern Settlement dutifully report that
Thorstein Olafsson married Sigrid Bjornsdotter
in Hvalsey Church on September 14th of that
year, with Brand Halldorstson, Thord
Jorundarson, Thorbjorn Bardarson, and Jon
Jonsson as witnesses, following the proclamation
of the wedding banns on three consecutive
Sundays.
The problem with the settlements, Diamond
argues, was that the Norse thought that
Greenland really was green; they treated it as
if it were the verdant farmland of southern
Norway. They cleared the land to create meadows
for their cows, and to grow hay to feed their
livestock through the long winter. They chopped
down the forests for fuel, and for the
construction of wooden objects. To make houses
warm enough for the winter, they built their
homes out of six-foot-thick slabs of turf, which
meant that a typical home consumed about ten
acres of grassland.
But Greenland’s ecosystem was too fragile to
withstand that kind of pressure. The short, cool
growing season meant that plants developed
slowly, which in turn meant that topsoil layers
were shallow and lacking in soil constituents,
like organic humus and clay, that hold moisture
and keep soil resilient in the face of strong
winds. “The sequence of soil erosion in
Greenland begins with cutting or burning the
cover of trees and shrubs, which are more
effective at holding soil than is grass,” he
writes. “With the trees and shrubs gone,
livestock, especially sheep and goats, graze
down the grass, which regenerates only slowly in
Greenland’s climate. Once the grass cover is
broken and the soil is exposed, soil is carried
away especially by the strong winds, and also by
pounding from occasionally heavy rains, to the
point where the topsoil can be removed for a
distance of miles from an entire valley.”
Without adequate pastureland, the summer hay
yields shrank; without adequate supplies of hay,
keeping livestock through the long winter got
harder. And, without adequate supplies of wood,
getting fuel for the winter became increasingly
difficult.
The Norse needed to reduce their reliance on
livestock—particularly cows, which consumed an
enormous amount of agricultural resources. But
cows were a sign of high status; to northern
Europeans, beef was a prized food. They needed
to copy the Inuit practice of burning seal
blubber for heat and light in the winter, and to
learn from the Inuit the difficult art of
hunting ringed seals, which were the most
reliably plentiful source of food available in
the winter. But the Norse had contempt for the
Inuit—they called them skraelings, “wretches”—and
preferred to practice their own brand of
European agriculture. In the summer, when the
Norse should have been sending ships on
lumber-gathering missions to Labrador, in order
to relieve the pressure on their own
forestlands, they instead sent boats and men to
the coast to hunt for walrus. Walrus tusks,
after all, had great trade value. In return for
those tusks, the Norse were able to acquire,
among other things, church bells, stained-glass
windows, bronze candlesticks, Communion wine,
linen, silk, silver, churchmen’s robes, and
jewelry to adorn their massive cathedral at
Gardar, with its three-ton sandstone building
blocks and eighty-foot bell tower. In the end,
the Norse starved to death.
Diamond’s argument stands in
sharp contrast to the conventional explanations
for a society’s collapse. Usually, we look for
some kind of cataclysmic event. The aboriginal
civilization of the Americas was decimated by
the sudden arrival of smallpox. European Jewry
was destroyed by Nazism. Similarly, the
disappearance of the Norse settlements is
usually blamed on the Little Ice Age, which
descended on Greenland in the early
fourteen-hundreds, ending several centuries of
relative warmth. (One archeologist refers to
this as the “It got too cold, and they died”
argument.) What all these explanations have in
common is the idea that civilizations are
destroyed by forces outside their control, by
acts of God.
But look, Diamond says, at Easter Island.
Once, it was home to a thriving culture that
produced the enormous stone statues that
continue to inspire awe. It was home to dozens
of species of trees, which created and protected
an ecosystem fertile enough to support as many
as thirty thousand people. Today, it’s a barren
and largely empty outcropping of volcanic rock.
What happened? Did a rare plant virus wipe out
the island’s forest cover? Not at all. The
Easter Islanders chopped their trees down, one
by one, until they were all gone. “I have often
asked myself, ‘What did the Easter Islander who
cut down the last palm tree say while he was
doing it?’ ” Diamond writes, and that, of
course, is what is so troubling about the
conclusions of “Collapse.” Those trees were
felled by rational actors—who must have
suspected that the destruction of this resource
would result in the destruction of their
civilization. The lesson of “Collapse” is that
societies, as often as not, aren’t murdered.
They commit suicide: they slit their wrists and
then, in the course of many decades, stand by
passively and watch themselves bleed to
death.
This doesn’t mean that acts of God don’t play
a role. It did get colder in Greenland in the
early fourteen-hundreds. But it didn’t get so
cold that the island became uninhabitable. The
Inuit survived long after the Norse died out,
and the Norse had all kinds of advantages,
including a more diverse food supply, iron
tools, and ready access to Europe. The problem
was that the Norse simply couldn’t adapt to the
country’s changing environmental conditions.
Diamond writes, for instance, of the fact that
nobody can find fish remains in Norse
archeological sites. One scientist sifted
through tons of debris from the Vatnahverfi farm
and found only three fish bones; another
researcher analyzed thirty-five thousand bones
from the garbage of another Norse farm and found
two fish bones. How can this be? Greenland is a
fisherman’s dream: Diamond describes running
into a Danish tourist in Greenland who had just
caught two Arctic char in a shallow pool with
her bare hands. “Every archaeologist who comes
to excavate in Greenland . . . starts out with
his or her own idea about where all those
missing fish bones might be hiding,” he writes.
“Could the Norse have strictly confined their
munching on fish to within a few feet of the
shoreline, at sites now underwater because of
land subsidence? Could they have faithfully
saved all their fish bones for fertilizer, fuel,
or feeding to cows?” It seems unlikely. There
are no fish bones in Norse archeological
remains, Diamond concludes, for the simple
reason that the Norse didn’t eat fish. For one
reason or another, they had a cultural taboo
against it.
Given the difficulty that the Norse had in
putting food on the table, this was insane.
Eating fish would have substantially reduced the
ecological demands of the Norse settlements. The
Norse would have needed fewer livestock and less
pastureland. Fishing is not nearly as
labor-intensive as raising cattle or hunting
caribou, so eating fish would have freed time
and energy for other activities. It would have
diversified their diet.
Why did the Norse choose not to eat fish?
Because they weren’t thinking about their
biological survival. They were thinking about
their cultural survival. Food taboos are one of
the idiosyncrasies that define a community. Not
eating fish served the same function as building
lavish churches, and doggedly replicating the
untenable agricultural practices of their land
of origin. It was part of what it meant to be
Norse, and if you are going to establish a
community in a harsh and forbidding environment
all those little idiosyncrasies which define and
cement a culture are of paramount importance.
“The Norse were undone by the same social glue
that had enabled them to master Greenland’s
difficulties,” Diamond writes. “The values to
which people cling most stubbornly under
inappropriate conditions are those values that
were previously the source of their greatest
triumphs over adversity.” He goes on:
To us in our
secular modern society, the predicament in which
the Greenlanders found themselves is difficult
to fathom. To them, however, concerned with
their social survival as much as their
biological survival, it was out of the question
to invest less in churches, to imitate or
intermarry with the Inuit, and thereby to face
an eternity in Hell just in order to survive
another winter on Earth.
Diamond’s distinction between social and
biological survival is a critical one, because
too often we blur the two, or assume that
biological survival is contingent on the
strength of our civilizational values. That was
the lesson taken from the two world wars and the
nuclear age that followed: we would survive as a
species only if we learned to get along and
resolve our disputes peacefully. The fact is,
though, that we can be law-abiding and
peace-loving and tolerant and inventive and
committed to freedom and true to our own values
and still behave in ways that are biologically
suicidal. The two kinds of survival are
separate.
Diamond points out that the Easter Islanders
did not practice, so far as we know, a uniquely
pathological version of South Pacific culture.
Other societies, on other islands in the
Hawaiian archipelago, chopped down trees and
farmed and raised livestock just as the Easter
Islanders did. What doomed the Easter Islanders
was the interaction between what they did and
where they were. Diamond and a colleague, Barry
Rollet, identified nine physical factors that
contributed to the likelihood of
deforestation—including latitude, average
rainfall, aerial-ash fallout, proximity to
Central Asia’s dust plume, size, and so on—and
Easter Island ranked at the high-risk end of
nearly every variable. “The reason for Easter’s
unusually severe degree of deforestation isn’t
that those seemingly nice people really were
unusually bad or improvident,” he concludes.
“Instead, they had the misfortune to be living
in one of the most fragile environments, at the
highest risk for deforestation, of any Pacific
people.” The problem wasn’t the Easter
Islanders. It was Easter Island.
In the second half of “Collapse,” Diamond
turns his attention to modern examples, and one
of his case studies is the recent genocide in
Rwanda. What happened in Rwanda is commonly
described as an ethnic struggle between the
majority Hutu and the historically dominant,
wealthier Tutsi, and it is understood in those
terms because that is how we have come to
explain much of modern conflict: Serb and Croat,
Jew and Arab, Muslim and Christian. The world is
a cauldron of cultural antagonism. It’s an
explanation that clearly exasperates Diamond.
The Hutu didn’t just kill the Tutsi, he points
out. The Hutu also killed other Hutu. Why? Look
at the land: steep hills farmed right up to the
crests, without any protective terracing; rivers
thick with mud from erosion; extreme
deforestation leading to irregular rainfall and
famine; staggeringly high population densities;
the exhaustion of the topsoil; falling
per-capita food production. This was a society
on the brink of ecological disaster, and if
there is anything that is clear from the study
of such societies it is that they inevitably
descend into genocidal chaos. In “Collapse,”
Diamond quite convincingly defends himself
against the charge of environmental determinism.
His discussions are always nuanced, and he gives
political and ideological factors their due. The
real issue is how, in coming to terms with the
uncertainties and hostilities of the world, the
rest of us have turned ourselves into cultural
determinists.
For the past thirty years,
Oregon has had one of the strictest sets of
land-use regulations in the nation, requiring
new development to be clustered in and around
existing urban development. The laws meant that
Oregon has done perhaps the best job in the
nation in limiting suburban sprawl, and
protecting coastal lands and estuaries. But this
November Oregon’s voters passed a ballot
referendum, known as Measure 37, that rolled
back many of those protections. Specifically,
Measure 37 said that anyone who could show that
the value of his land was affected by
regulations implemented since its purchase was
entitled to compensation from the state. If the
state declined to pay, the property owner would
be exempted from the regulations.
To call Measure 37—and similar referendums
that have been passed recently in other
states—intellectually incoherent is to put it
mildly. It might be that the reason your
hundred-acre farm on a pristine hillside is
worth millions to a developer is that it’s on a
pristine hillside: if everyone on that hillside
could subdivide, and sell out to Target and
Wal-Mart, then nobody’s plot would be worth
millions anymore. Will the voters of Oregon then
pass Measure 38, allowing them to sue the state
for compensation over damage to property values
caused by Measure 37?
It is hard to read “Collapse,” though, and
not have an additional reaction to Measure 37.
Supporters of the law spoke entirely in the
language of political ideology. To them, the
measure was a defense of property rights,
preventing the state from unconstitutional
“takings.” If you replaced the term “property
rights” with “First Amendment rights,” this
would have been indistinguishable from an
argument over, say, whether charitable groups
ought to be able to canvass in malls, or whether
cities can control the advertising they sell on
the sides of public buses. As a society, we do a
very good job with these kinds of debates: we
give everyone a hearing, and pass laws, and make
compromises, and square our conclusions with our
constitutional heritage—and in the Oregon debate
the quality of the theoretical argument was
impressively high.
The thing that got lost in the debate,
however, was the land. In a rapidly growing
state like Oregon, what, precisely, are the
state’s ecological strengths and
vulnerabilities? What impact will changed
land-use priorities have on water and soil and
cropland and forest? One can imagine Diamond
writing about the Measure 37 debate, and he
wouldn’t be very impressed by how seriously
Oregonians wrestled with the problem of squaring
their land-use rules with their values, because
to him a society’s environmental birthright is
not best discussed in those terms. Rivers and
streams and forests and soil are a biological
resource. They are a tangible, finite thing, and
societies collapse when they get so consumed
with addressing the fine points of their history
and culture and deeply held beliefs—with making
sure that Thorstein Olafsson and Sigrid
Bjornsdotter are married before the right number
of witnesses following the announcement of
wedding banns on the right number of
Sundays—that they forget that the pastureland is
shrinking and the forest cover is gone.
When archeologists looked through the ruins
of the Western Settlement, they found plenty of
the big wooden objects that were so valuable in
Greenland—crucifixes, bowls, furniture, doors,
roof timbers—which meant that the end came too
quickly for anyone to do any scavenging. And,
when the archeologists looked at the animal
bones left in the debris, they found the bones
of newborn calves, meaning that the Norse, in
that final winter, had given up on the future.
They found toe bones from cows, equal to the
number of cow spaces in the barn, meaning that
the Norse ate their cattle down to the hoofs,
and they found the bones of dogs covered with
knife marks, meaning that, in the end, they had
to eat their pets. But not fish bones, of
course. Right up until they starved to death,
the Norse never lost sight of what they stood
for.