The Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn: Intended as an Appendix to Observations on the Corn Law"

    by Rev. T.R. Malthus, Professor of History and Political Economy 
    in the East India College, London, Printed for John Murray, 
    Albermarle Street, and J. Johnson and Co., St. Paul's Church 
    Yard, 1815. 

         The professed object of the Observations on the corn laws, which
    I published in the spring of 1814, was to state with the strictest impartiality the advantages and disadvantages which, in 
    the actual circumstances of our present situation, were likely to 
    attend the measures under consideration, respecting the trade in 
    corn. 
        
         A fair review of both sides of the question, without any 
    attempt to conceal the peculiar evils, whether temporary or 
    permanent, which might belong to each, appeared to me of use, not 
    only to assist in forming an enlightened decision on the subject, 
    but particularly to prepare the public for the specific 
    consequences which were to be expected from that decision, on 
    whatever side it might be made. Such a preparation, from some 
    quarter or other, seemed to be necessary, to prevent those just 
    discontents which would naturally have arisen, if the measure 
    adopted had been attended with results very different from those 
    which had been promised by its advocates, or contemplated by the 
    legislature. 
        
         With this object in view, it was neither necessary, nor 
    desirable, that I should myself express a decided opinion on the 
    subject. It would hardly, indeed, have been consistent with that 
    character of impartiality, which I wished to give to my 
    statements, and in which I have reason to believe I in some 
    degree succeeded.(1*) 
        
          These previous statements, however, having been given, and 
    having, I hope, shown that the decision, whenever it is made, 
    must be a compromise of contending advantages and disadvantages, 
    I have no objection now to state (without the least reserve), and 
    I can truly say, wit the most complete freedom from all 
    interested motives, the grounds of a deliberate, yet decided, 
    opinion in favour of some restrictions on the importation of 
    foreign corn. 
        
         This opinion has been formed, as I wished the readers of the 
    Observations to form their opinions, by looking fairly at the 
    difficulties on both sides of the question; and without vainly 
    expecting to attain unmixed results, determining on which side 
    there is the greatest balance of good with the least alloy of 
    evil. The grounds on which the opinion so formed rests, are 
    partly those which were stated in the Observations, and partly, 
    and indeed mainly, some facts which have occurred during the last 
    year, and which have given, as I think, a decisive weight to the 
    side of restrictions. 
        
         These additional facts are, first, the evidence, which has 
    been laid before Parliament, relating to the effects of the 
    present prices of corn, together with the experience of the 
    present year; secondly, the improved state of our exchanges, and 
    the fall in the price of bullion; and thirdly, and mainly, the 
    actual laws respecting the exportation of corn lately passed in 
    France. 
        
         1. In the Observations on the corn laws, I endeavoured to 
    show that, according to the general principles of supply and 
    demand, a considerable fall in the price of corn could not take 
    place, without throwing much poor lad out of cultivation, and 
    effectually preventing, for a considerable time, all further 
    improvements in agriculture, which have for their object an 
    increase of produce. 
        
         The general principles, on which I calculated upon these 
    consequences, have been fully confirmed by the evidence brought 
    before the two houses of Parliament; and the effects of a 
    considerable fall in the price of corn, and of the expected 
    continuance of low prices, have shown themselves in a very severe 
    shock to the cultivation of the country and a great loss of 
    agricultural capital. 
        
         Whatever may be said of the peculiar interests and natural 
    partialities of those who were called upon to give evidence upon 
    this occasion, it is impossible not to be convinced, by the whole 
    body of it taken together, that, during the last twenty years, 
    and particularly during the last seven, there has been a great 
    increase of capital laid out upon the land, and a great 
    consequent extension of cultivation and improvement; that the 
    system of spirited improvement and high farming, as it is 
    technically called, has been principally encouraged by the 
    progressive rise of prices owing in a considerable degree, to the 
    difficulties thrown in the way of importation of foreign corn by 
    the war; that the rapid accumulation of capital on the land, 
    which it had occasioned, had so increased our home growth of 
    corn, that, notwithstanding a great increase of population, we 
    had become much less dependent upon foreign supplies for our 
    support; and that the land was still deficient in capital, and 
    would admit of the employment of such an addition to its present 
    amount, as would be competent to the full supply of a greatly 
    increased population: but that the fall of prices, which had 
    lately taken place, and the alarm of a still further fall, from 
    continued importation, had not only checked all progress of 
    improvement, but had already occasioned a considerable loss of 
    agricultural advances; and that a continuation of low prices 
    would, in spite of a diminution of rents, unquestionably destroy 
    a great mass of farming capital all over the country, and 
    essentially diminish its cultivation and produce. 
        
         It has been sometimes said, that the losses at present 
    sustained by farmers are merely the natural and necessary 
    consequences of overtrading, and that they must bear them as all 
    other merchants do, who have entered into unsuccessful 
    speculations. But surely the question is not, or at least ought 
    not to be, about the losses and profits of farmers, and the 
    present condition of landholders compared with the past. It may 
    be necessary, perhaps, to make inquiries of this kind, with a 
    view to ulterior objects; but the real question respects the 
    great loss of national wealth, attributed to a change in the 
    spirit of our legislative enactments relating to the admission of 
    foreign corn. 
        
         We have certainly no right to accuse our farmers of rash 
    speculation for employing so large a capital in agriculture. The 
    peace, it must be allowed, was most unexpected; and if the war 
    had continued, the actual quantity of capital applied to the 
    land, might have been as necessary to save the country from 
    extreme want in future, as it obviously was in 1812, when, with 
    the price of corn at above six guineas a quarter, we could only 
    import a little more than 100,000 quarters. If, from the very 
    great extension of cultivation, during the four or five preceding 
    years, we had not obtained a very great increase of average 
    produce, the distresses of that year would have assumed a most 
    serious aspect. 
        
         There is certainly no one cause which can affect mercantile 
    concerns, at all comparable in the extent of its effects, to the 
    cause now operating upon agricultural capital. Individual losses 
    must have the same distressing consequences in both cases, and 
    they are often more complete, and the fall is greater, in the 
    shocks of commerce. But I doubt, whether in the most extensive 
    mercantile distress that ever took in this country, there was 
    ever one fourth of the property, or one tenth of the number of 
    individuals concerned, when compared with the effects of the 
    present rapid fall of raw produce, combined with the very scanty 
    crop of last year.(2*) 
        
         Individual losses of course become national, according as 
    they affect a greater mass of the national capital, and a greater 
    number of individuals; and I think it must be allowed further, 
    that no loss, in proportion to its amount, affects the interest 
    of the nation so deeply, and vitally, and is so difficult to 
    recover, as the loss of agricultural capital and produce. 
        
         If it be the intention of the legislature fairly to look at 
    the evils, as well as the good, which belongs to both sides of 
    the question, it must be allowed, that the evidence laid before 
    the two houses of Parliament, and still more particularly the 
    experience of the last year, show, that the immediate evils which 
    are capable of being remedied by a system of restrictions, are of 
    no inconsiderable magnitude. 
        
         2. In the Observations on the corn laws, I gave, as a reason 
    for some delay in coming to a final regulation respecting the 
    price at which foreign corn might be imported, the very uncertain 
    state of the currency. I observed, that three different 
    importation prices would be necessary, according as our currency 
    should either rise to the then price of bullion, should continue 
    at the same nominal value, or should take an intermediate 
    position, founded on a fall in the value of bullion, owing to the 
    discontinuance of an extraordinary demand for it, and a rise in 
    the value of paper, owing to the prospect of a return to payments 
    in specie. In the course of this last year, the state of our 
    exchanges, and the fall in the price of bullion, show pretty 
    clearly, that the intermediate alteration which, I then 
    contemplated, greater than in the case first mentioned, and less 
    than in the second, is the one which might be adopted with a fair 
    prospect of permanence; and that we should not now proceed under 
    the same uncertainty respecting the currency, which we should 
    have done, if we had adopted a final regulation in the early part 
    of last year.(3*) This intermediate alteration, however, supposes 
    a rise in the value of paper on a return to cash payments, and 
    some general fall of prices quite unconnected with any 
    regulations respecting the corn trade.(4*) 
        
         But, if some fall of prices must take place from this cause, 
    and if such a fall can never take place without a considerable 
    check to industry, and discouragement to the accumulation of 
    capital, it certainly does not seem a well-chosen time for the 
    legislature to occasion another fall still greater, by departing 
    at once from a system of restrictions which it had pursued with 
    steadiness during the greatest part of the last century and, 
    after having given up for a short period, had adopted again as 
    its final policy in its two last enactments respecting the trade 
    in corn. Even if it be intended. Finally, to throw open our 
    ports, it might be wise to pass some temporary regulations, in 
    order to prevent the very great shock which must take place, if 
    the two causes here noticed, of the depreciation of commodities, 
    be allowed to produce their full effect by contemporaneous 
    action. 
        
         3. I stated, in the Observations on the corn laws, that the 
    cheapness and steadiness in the price of corn, which were 
    promised by the advocates of restrictions, were not attainable by 
    the measures they proposed; that it was really impossible for us 
    to grow at home a sufficiency for our own consumption, without 
    keeping up the price of corn considerably above the average of 
    the rest of Europe; and that, while this was the case, as we 
    could never export to any advantage, we should always be liable 
    to the variations of price, occasioned by the glut of a 
    superabundant harvest; in short, that it must be allowed that a 
    free trade in corn would, in all ordinary cases, not only secure 
    a cheaper, but a more steady, supply of grain. 
        
         In expressing this distinct opinion on the effects of a free 
    trade in corn, I certainly meant to refer to a trade really free 
    - that is, a trade by which a nation would be entitled to its 
    share of the produce of the commercial world, according to its 
    means of purchasing, whether that produce were plentiful or 
    scanty. In this sense I adhere strictly to the opinion I then 
    gave; but, since that period, an event has occurred which has 
    shown, in the clearest manner, that it is entirely out of our 
    power, even in time of peace, to obtain a free trade in corn, or 
    an approximation towards it, whatever may be our wishes on the 
    subject. 
        
         It has, perhaps, not been sufficiently attended to in 
    general, when the advantages of a free trade in corn have been 
    discussed, that the jealousies and fears of nations, respecting 
    their means of subsistence, will very rarely allow of a free 
    egress of corn, when it is in any degree scarce. Our own 
    statutes, till the very last year, prove these fears with regard 
    to ourselves; and regulations of the same tendency occasionally 
    come in aid of popular clamour in almost all countries of Europe. 
    But the laws respecting the exportation of corn, which have been 
    passed in France during the last year, have brought this subject 
    home to us in the most striking and impressive manner. Our 
    nearest neighbour, possessed of the largest and finest corn 
    country in Europe, and who, owing to a more favourable climate 
    and soil, a more stationary and comparatively less crowded 
    population, and a lighter weight of taxation, can grow corn at 
    less than half our prices, has enacted, that the exportation of 
    corn shall be free till the price rises to about forty nine 
    shillings a quarter,(5*) and that then it shall be entirely 
    cease.(6*) 
        
         From the vicinity of France, and the cheapness of its corn in 
    all years of common abundance, it is scarcely possible that our 
    main imports should not come from that quarter as long as our 
    ports are open to receive them. In this first year of open trade, 
    our imports have been such, as to show, that though the corn of 
    the Baltic cannot seriously depress our prices in an unfavourable 
    season at home, the corn of France may make it fall below a 
    growing price, under the pressure of one of the worst crops that 
    has been known for a long series of years. 
        
         I have at present before me an extract from a Rouen paper, 
    containing the prices of corn in fourteen different markets for 
    the first week in October, the average of which appears to be 
    about thirty eight shillings a quarter;(7*) and this was after 
    disturbances had taken place both at Havre and Dieppe, on account 
    of the quantity exported, and the rise of prices which it had 
    occasioned. 
        
         It may be said, perhaps, that the last harvest of France has 
    been a very favourable one, and affords no just criterion of its 
    general prices. But, from all that I hear, prices have often been 
    as low during the last ten years. And, an average not exceeding 
    forty shillings a quarter may, I think, be conclusively inferred 
    from the price at which exportation is by law to cease. 
        
         At a time when, according to Adam Smith, the growing price in 
    this country was only twenty eight shillings a quarter, and the 
    average price, including years of scarcity, only thirty three 
    shillings, exportation was not prohibited till the price rose to 
    forty eight shillings. It was the intention of the English 
    government, at that time, to encourage agriculture by giving vent 
    to its produce. We may presume that the same motive influenced 
    the government of France in the late act respecting exportation. 
    And it is fair therefore to conclude, that the price of wheat, in 
    common years, is considerably less than the price at which 
    exportation is to cease. 
        
         With these prices so near us, and with the consequent power 
    of supplying ourselves with great comparative rapidity, which in 
    the corn trade is a point of the greatest importance, there can 
    be no doubt that, if our ports were open, our principal supplies 
    of grain would come from France; and that, in all years of common 
    plenty in that country, we should import more largely from it 
    than from the Baltic. But from this quarter, which would then 
    become our main and most habitual source of supply, all 
    assistance would be at once cut off, in every season of only 
    moderate scarcity; and we should have to look to other quarters, 
    from which it is an established fact, that large sudden supplies 
    cannot be obtained, not only for our usual imports, and the 
    natural variations which belong to them, but for those which had 
    been suddenly cut off from France, and which our habitually 
    deficient growth had now rendered absolutely necessary. 
        
         To open our ports, under these circumstances, is not to 
    obtain a free trade in corn; and, while I should say, without 
    hesitation, that a free trade in corn was calculated to produce 
    steadier prices than the system of restrictions with which it has 
    been compared, I should, with as little hesitation say, that such 
    a trade in corn, as has been described, would be subject to much 
    more distressing and cruel variations, than the most determined 
    system of prohibitions. 
        
         Such a species of commerce in grain shakes the foundations, 
    and alters entirely the data on which the general principles of 
    free trade are established. For what do these principles say? 
    They say, and say most justly, that if every nation were to 
    devote itself particularly to those kinds of industry and 
    produce, to which its soil, climate, situation, capital, and 
    skill, were best suited; and were then freely to exchange these 
    products with each other, it would be the most certain and 
    efficacious mode, not only. of advancing the wealth and 
    prosperity of the whole body of the commercial republic with the 
    quickest pace, but of giving to each individual nation of the 
    body the full and perfect use of all its resources. 
        
         I am very far indeed from meaning to insinuate, that if we 
    cannot have the most perfect freedom of trade, we should have 
    none; or that a great nation must immediately alter its 
    commercial policy, whenever any of the countries with which it 
    deals passes laws inconsistent with the principles of freedom. 
    But I protest most entirely against the doctrine, that we are to 
    pursue our general principles without ever looking to see if they 
    are applicable to the case before us; and that in politics and 
    political economy, we are to go straight forward, as we certainly 
    ought to do in morals, without any reference to the conduct and 
    proceedings of others. 
        
         There is no person in the least acquainted with political 
    economy, but must be aware that the advantages resulting from the 
    division of labour, as applicable to nations as well as 
    individuals, depend solely and entirely on the power of 
    exchanging subsequently the products of labour. And no one can 
    hesitate to allow, that it is completely in the power of others 
    to prevent such exchanges, and to destroy entirely the advantages 
    which would otherwise result from the application of individual 
    or national industry, to peculiar and appropriate products. 
        
         Let us suppose, for instance, that the inhabitants of the 
    Lowlands of Scotland were to say to the Highlanders, 'We will 
    exchange our corn for your cattle, whenever we have a 
    superfluity; but if our crops in any degree fail, you must not 
    expect to have a single grain': would not the question respecting 
    the policy of the present change, which is taking place in the 
    Highlands, rest entirely upon different grounds? Would it not be 
    perfectly senseless in the Highlanders to think only of those 
    general principles which direct them to employ the soil in the 
    way that is best suited to it? If supplies of corn could not be 
    obtained with some degree of steadiness and certainty from other 
    quarters, would it not be absolutely necessary for them to grow 
    it themselves, however ill adapted to it might be their soil and 
    climate? 
        
         The same may be said of all the pasture districts of Great 
    Britain, compared with the surrounding corn countries. If they 
    could only obtain the superfluities of their neighbours, and were 
    entitled to no share of the produce when it was scarce, they 
    could not certainly devote themselves with any degree of safety 
    to their present occupations. 
        
         There is, on this account, a grand difference between the 
    freedom of the home trade in corn, and the freedom of the foreign 
    trade. A government of tolerable vigour can make the home trade 
    in corn really free. It can secure to the pasture districts, or 
    the towns that must be fed from a distance, their share of the 
    general produce, whether plentiful or scarce. It can set them 
    quite at rest about the power of exchanging the peculiar products 
    of their own labour for the other products which are necessary to 
    them, and can dispense, therefore, to all its subjects, the 
    inestimable advantages of an unrestricted intercourse. 
        
         But it is not in the power of any single nation to secure the 
    freedom of the foreign trade in corn. To accomplish this, the 
    concurrence of many others is necessary; and this concurrence, 
    the fears and jealousies so universally prevalent about the means 
    of subsistence, almost invariably prevent. There is hardly a 
    nation in Europe which does not occasionally exercise the power 
    of stopping entirely, or heavily taxing, its exports of grain, if 
    prohibitions do not form part of its general code of laws. 
        
         The question then before us is evidently a special, not a 
    general one. It is not a question between the advantages of a 
    free trade, and a system of restrictions; but between a specific 
    system of restrictions formed by ourselves for the purpose of 
    rendering us, in average years, nearly independent of foreign 
    supplies, and the specific system of restricted importations, 
    which alone it is in our power to obtain under the existing laws 
    of France, and in the actual state of the other countries of the 
    continent.(8*) 
        
         In looking, in the first place, at the resources of the 
    country, with a view to an independent supply for an increasing 
    population; and comparing subsequently the advantages of the two 
    systems abovementioned, without overlooking their disadvantages, 
    I have fully made up my mind as to the side on which the balance 
    lies; and am decidedly of opinion, that a system of restrictions 
    so calculated as to keep us, in average years, nearly independent 
    of foreign supplies of corn, will more effectually conduce to the 
    wealth and prosperity of the country, and of by far the greatest 
    mass of the inhabitants, than the opening of our ports for the 
    free admission of foreign corn, in the actual state of Europe. 
        
         Of the resources of Great Britain and Ireland for the further 
    growth of corn, by the further application of capital to the 
    land, the evidence laid before parliament furnishes the most 
    ample testimony. But it is not necessary, for this purpose, to 
    recur to evidence that may be considered as partial. All the most 
    intelligent works which have been written on agricultural 
    subjects of late years, agree in the same statements; and they 
    are confirmed beyond a possibility of doubt, when we consider the 
    extraordinary improvements, and prodigious increase of produce 
    that have taken place latterly in some districts, which, in point 
    of natural soil, are not superior to others that are still 
    yielding the most scanty and miserable crops. Most of the light 
    soils of the kingdom might, with adequate capital and skill, be 
    made to equal the improved parts of Norfolk; and the vast tracts 
    of clay lands that are yet in a degraded state almost all over 
    the kingdom, are susceptible of a degree of improvement, which it 
    is by no means easy to fix, but which certainly offers a great 
    prospective increase of produce. There is even a chance (but on 
    this I will not insist) of a diminution in the real price of 
    corn,(9*) owing to the extension of those great improvements, and 
    that great economy and good management of labour, of which we 
    have such intelligent accounts from Scotland.(10*) If these clay 
    lands, by draining, and the plentiful application of lime and 
    other manures, could be so far meliorated in quality as to admit 
    of being worked by two horses and a single man, instead of three 
    or four horses with a man and a boy, what a vast saving of labour 
    and expense would at once be effected, at the same time that the 
    crops would be prodigiously increased! And such an improvement 
    may rationally be expected, from what has really been 
    accomplished in particular districts. In short, if merely the 
    best modes of cultivation, now in use in some parts of Great 
    Britain, were generally extended, and the whole country was 
    brought to a level, in proportion to its natural advantages of 
    soil and situation, by the further accumulation and more equable 
    distribution of capital and skill; the quantity of additional 
    produce would be immense, and would afford the means of 
    subsistence to a very great increase of population. 
        
         In some countries possessed of a small territory, and 
    consisting perhaps chiefly of one or two large cities, it never 
    can be made a question, whether or not they should freely import 
    foreign corn. They exist, in fact, by this importation; and being 
    always, in point of population, inconsiderable, they may, in 
    general, rely upon a pretty regular supply. But whether regular 
    or not, they have no choice. Nature has clearly told them, that 
    if they increase in wealth and power to any extent, it can only 
    be by living upon the raw produce of other countries. 
        
         It is quite evident that the same alternative is not 
    presented to Great Britain and Ireland, and that the united 
    empire has ample means of increasing in wealth, population, and 
    power, for a very long course of years, without being habitually 
    dependent upon foreign supplies for the means of supporting its 
    inhabitants. 
        
         As we have clearly, therefore, our choice between two 
    systems, under either of which we may certainly look forwards to 
    a progressive increase of population and power; it remains for us 
    to consider in which way the greatest portion of wealth and 
    happiness may be steadily secured to the largest mass of the 
    people. 
        
         1. And first let us look to the labouring classes of society, 
    as the foundation on which the whole fabric rests; and, from 
    their numbers, unquestionably of the greatest weight, in any 
    estimate of national happiness. 
        
         If I were convinced, that to open our ports, would be 
    permanently to improve the condition of the labouring classes of 
    society, I should consider the question as at once determined in 
    favour of such a measure. But I own it appears to me, after the 
    most deliberate attention to the subject, that it will be 
    attended with effects very different from those of improvement. 
    We are very apt to be deceived by names, and to be captivated 
    with the idea of cheapness, without reflecting that the term is 
    merely relative, and that it is very possible for a people to be 
    miserably poor, and some of them starving, in a country where the 
    money price of corn is very low. Of this the histories of Europe 
    and Asia will afford abundant instances. 
        
         In considering the condition of the lower classes of society, 
    we must consider only the real exchangeable value of labour; that 
    is, its power of commanding the necessaries, conveniences, and 
    luxuries of life. 
        
         I stated in the Observations, and more at large in the 
    Inquiry into rents,(11*) that under the same demand for labour, 
    and the same consequent power of purchasing the means of 
    subsistence, a high money price of corn would give the labourer a 
    very great advantage in the purchase of the conveniences and 
    luxuries of life. The effect of this high money price would not, 
    of course, be so marked among the very poorest of the society, 
    and those who had the largest families; because so very great a 
    part of their earnings must be employed in absolute necessaries. 
    But to all those above the very poorest, the advantage of wages 
    resulting from a price of eighty shillings a quarter for wheat, 
    compared with fifty or sixty, would in the purchase of tea, 
    sugar, cotton, linens, soap, candles, and many other articles, be 
    such as to make their condition decidedly superior. 
        
         Nothing could counterbalance this, but a much greater demand 
    for labour; and such an increased demand, in consequence of the 
    opening of our ports, is at best problematical. The check to 
    cultivation has been so sudden and decisive, as already to throw 
    a great number of agricultural labourers out of employment;(12*) 
    and in Ireland this effect has taken place to such a degree, as 
    to threaten the most distressing, and even alarming, 
    consequences. The farmers, in some districts, have entirely lost 
    the little capital they possessed; and, unable to continue in 
    their farms, have deserted them, and left their labourers without 
    the means of employment. In a country, the peculiar defects of 
    which were already a deficiency of capital, and a redundancy of 
    population, such a check to the means of employing labour must be 
    attended with no common distress. In Ireland, it is quite 
    certain, that there are no mercantile capitals ready to take up 
    those persons who are thus thrown out of work, and even in Great 
    Britain the transfer will be slow and difficult. 
        
         Our commerce and manufactures, therefore, must increase very 
    considerably before they can restore the demand for labour 
    already lost; for the and a moderate increase beyond this will 
    scarcely make up disadvantage of a low money price of wages. 
        
         These wages will finally be determined by the usual money 
    price of corn, and the state of the demand for labour. 
        
         There is a difference between what may be called the usual 
    price of corn and the average price, which has not been 
    sufficiently attended to. Let us suppose the common price of 
    corn, for four years out of five, to be about £2 a quarter, and 
    during the fifth year to be £6. The average price of the five 
    years will then be £2. 16s.; but the usual price will still be 
    about £2, and it is by this price, and not by the price of a year 
    of scarcity, or even the average including it, that wages are 
    generally regulated. 
        
         If the ports were open, the usual price of corn would 
    certainly fall, and probably the average price; but from at has 
    before been said of the existing laws of France, and of the 
    practice among the Baltic nations of raising the tax on their 
    exported corn in proportion to the demand for it, there is every 
    reason to believe, that the fluctuations of price would be much 
    greater. Such would, at least, be my conclusion from theory; and, 
    I think, it has been confirmed by the experience of the last 
    hundred years. During this time, the period of our greatest 
    importations, and of our greatest dependence upon foreign corn, 
    was from 1792 to 1805 inclusive; and certainly in no fourteen 
    years of the whole hundred were the fluctuations of price so 
    great. In 1792 the price was 42s. a quarter; in 1796, 77s.; in 
    1801, 118s. a quarter; and, in 1803, 56s. Between the year 1792 
    and 1801 the rise was almost a triple, and in the short period 
    from 1798 to 1803, it rose from 50s. to 118s. and fell again to 
    56s.(13*) 
        
         I would not insist upon this existence as absolutely 
    conclusive, on account of the mixture of accident in all such 
    appeals to facts; but it certainly tends to confirm the 
    probability of those great fluctuations which, according to all 
    general principles, I should expect from the temper and customs 
    of nations, with regard to the egress of corn, when it is scarce; 
    and particularly from the existing laws of that country, which, 
    in all common years, will furnish us with a large proportion of 
    our supplies. 
        
         To these causes of temporary fluctuations, during peace, 
    should be added the more durable as well as temporary, 
    fluctuations occasioned by war. Without reference to the danger 
    of excessive scarcity from another combination against us, if we 
    are merely driven back at certain distant intervals upon our own 
    resources, the experience of the present times will teach us not 
    to estimate lightly the convulsion which attends the return, and 
    the evils of such alternations of price. 
        
         In the Observations, I mentioned some causes of fluctuations 
    which would attend the system of restrictions; but they are in my 
    opinion inconsiderable, compared with those which have been just 
    referred to. 
        
         On the labouring classes, therefore, the effects of opening 
    our ports for the free importation of foreign corn, will be 
    greatly to lower their wages, and to subject them to much greater 
    fluctuations of price. And, in this state of things, it will 
    require a much greater increase in the demand for labour, than 
    there is in any rational ground for expecting, to compensate to 
    the labourer the advantages which he loses in the high money 
    wages of labour, and the steadier and less fluctuating price of 
    corn. 
        
         2. Of the next most important class of society, those who 
    live upon the profits of stock, one half probably are farmers, or 
    immediately connected with farmers; and of the property of the 
    other half, not above one fourth is engaged in foreign trade. 
        
         Of the farmers it is needless to say anything. It cannot be 
    doubted that they will suffer severely from the opening of the 
    ports. Not that the profits of farming will not recover 
    themselves, after a certain period, and be as great, or perhaps 
    greater, than they were before; but this cannot take place till 
    after a great loss of agricultural capital, or the removal of it 
    into the channels of commerce and manufactures. 
        
         Of the commercial and manufacturing part of the society, only 
    those who are directly engaged in foreign trade, will feel the 
    benefit of the importing system. It is of course to be expected, 
    that the foreign trade of the nation will increase considerably. 
    If it do not, indeed, we shall have experienced a very severe 
    loss, without anything like a compensation for it. And if this 
    increase merely equals the loss of produce sustained by 
    agriculture, the quantity of other produce remaining the same, it 
    is quite clear that the country cannot possibly gain by the 
    exchange, at whatever price it may buy or sell. Wealth does not 
    consist in the dearness or cheapness of the usual measure of 
    value, but in the quantity of produce; and to increase 
    effectively this quantity of produce, after the severe check 
    sustained by agriculture, it is necessary that commerce should 
    make a very powerful start. 
        
         In the actual state of Europe and the prevailing jealousy of 
    our manufactures, such a start seems quite doubtful; and it is by 
    no means impossible that we shall be obliged to pay for our 
    foreign corn, by importing less of other commodities, as well as 
    by exporting more of our manufactures. 
        
         It may be said, perhaps, that a fall in the price of our corn 
    and labour, affords the only chance to our manufacturers of 
    retaining possession of the foreign markets; and that though the 
    produce of the country may not be increased by the fall in the 
    price of corn, such a fall is necessary to prevent a positive 
    diminution of it. There is some weight undoubtedly in this 
    argument. But if we look at the probable effects of returning 
    peace to Europe, it is impossible to suppose that, even with a 
    considerable diminution in the price of labour, we should not 
    lose some markets on the continent, for those manufactures in 
    which we have no peculiar advantage; while we have every reason 
    to believe that in others, where our colonies, our navigation, 
    our long credits, our coals, and our mines come in question, as 
    well as our skill and capital, we shall retain our trade in spite 
    of high wages. Under these circumstances, it seems peculiarly 
    advisable to maintain unimpaired, if possible, the home market, 
    and not to lose the demand occasioned by so much of the rents of 
    land, and of the profits and capital of farmers, as must 
    necessarily be destroyed by the check to our home produce. 
        
         But in whatever way the country may be affected by the 
    change, we must suppose that those who are immediately engaged in 
    foreign trade will benefit by it. As those, however, form but a 
    very small portion of the class of persons living on the profits 
    of stock, in point of number, and not probably above a seventh or 
    eighth in point of property, their interests cannot be allowed to 
    weigh against the interests of so very large a majority. 
        
         With regard to this great majority, it is impossible that 
    they should not feel very widely and severely the diminution of 
    their nominal capital by the fall of prices. We know the magic 
    effect upon industry of a rise of prices. It has been noticed by 
    Hume, and witnessed by every person who has attended to subjects 
    of this kind. And the effects of a fall are proportionately 
    depressing. Even the foreign trade will not escape its influence, 
    though here it may be counterbalanced by a real increase of 
    demand. But, in the internal trade, not only will the full effect 
    of this deadening weight be experienced, but there is reason to 
    fear that it may be accompanied with an actual diminution of home 
    demand. There may be the same or even a greater quantity of corn 
    consumed in the country, but a smaller quantity of manufactures 
    and colonial produce; and our foreign corn may be purchased in 
    part by commodities which were before consumed at home. In this 
    case, the whole of the internal trade must severely suffer, and 
    the wealth and enjoyments of the country be decidedly diminished. 
    The quantity of a country's exports is a very uncertain criterion 
    of its wealth. The quantity of produce permanently consumed at 
    home is, perhaps, the most certain criterion of wealth to which 
    we can refer. 
        
         Already, in all the country towns, this diminution of demand 
    has been felt in a very great degree; and the surrounding 
    farmers, who chiefly support them, are quite unable to make their 
    accustomed purchases. If the home produce of grain be 
    considerably diminished by the opening of our ports, of which 
    there can be no doubt, these effects in the agricultural 
    countries must be permanent, though not to the same extent as at 
    present. And even if the manufacturing towns should ultimately 
    increase, in proportion to the losses of the country, of which 
    there is great reason to doubt, the transfer of wealth and 
    population will be slow, painful, and unfavourable to happiness. 
        
         3. Of the class of landholders, it may be truly said, that 
    though they do not so actively contribute to the production of 
    wealth, as either of the classes just noticed, there is no class 
    in society whose interests are more nearly and intimately 
    connected with the prosperity of the state. 
        
         Some persons have been of opinion, and Adam Smith himself 
    among others, that a rise or fall of the price of corn does not 
    really affect the interests of the landholders; but both theory 
    and experience prove the contrary; and show, that, under all 
    common circumstances, a fall of price must be attended with a 
    diminution of produce, and that a diminution of produce will 
    naturally be attended with a diminution of rent.(14*) 
        
         Of the effect, therefore, of opening the ports, in 
    diminishing both the real and nominal rents of the landlords, 
    there can be no doubt; and we must not imagine that the interest 
    of a body of men, so circumstanced as the landlords, can 
    materially suffer without affecting the interests of the state. 
        
         It has been justly observed by Adam Smith, that 'no equal 
    quantity of productive labour employed in manufactures can ever 
    occasion so great a reproduction as in agriculture.' If we 
    suppose the rents of land taken throughout the kingdom to be one 
    fourth of the gross produce, it is evident, that to purchase the 
    same value of raw produce by means of manufactures, would require 
    one third more capital. Every five thousand pounds laid out on 
    the land, not only repays the usual profits of stock, but 
    generates an additional value, which goes to the landlord. And 
    this additional value is not a mere benefit to a particular 
    individual, or set of individuals, but affords the most steady 
    home demand for the manufactures of the country, the most 
    effective fund for its financial support, and the largest 
    disposable force for its army and navy. It is true, that the last 
    additions to the agricultural produce of an improving country are 
    not attended with a large proportion of rent;(15*) and it is 
    precisely this circumstance that may make it answer to a rich 
    country to import some of its corn, if it can be secure of 
    obtaining an equable supply. But in all cases the importation of 
    foreign corn must fail to answer nationally, if it is not so much 
    cheaper than the corn that can be grown at home, as to equal both 
    the profits and the rent of the grain which it displaces. 
        
         If two capitals of ten thousand pounds each, be employed, one 
    in manufactures, and the other in the improvement of the land, 
    with the usual profits, and witHdrawn in twenty years, the one 
    employed in manufactures will leave nothing behind it, while the 
    one employed on the land will probably leave a rent of no 
    inconsiderable value. 
        
         These considerations, which are not often attended to, if 
    they do not affect the ordinary question of a free trade in corn, 
    must at least be allowed to have weight, when the policy of such 
    a trade is, from peculiarity of situation and circumstances, 
    rendered doubtful. 
        
         4. We now come to a class of society, who will unquestionably 
    be benefited by the opening of our ports. These are the 
    stockholders, and tHose who live upon fixed salaries.(16*) They 
    are not only, however, small in number, compared with those who 
    will be affected in a different manner; but their interests are 
    not so closely interwoven with the welfare of the state, as the 
    classes already considered, particularly the labouring classes, 
    and the landlords. 
        
         In the Observations, I remarked, that it was 'an error of the 
    most serious magnitude to suppose that any natural or artificial 
    causes, which should raise or lower the values of corn or silver, 
    might be considered as matters of indifference; and that, 
    practically, no material change could take place in the value of 
    either, without producing both temporary and lasting effects, 
    which have a most powerful influence on the distribution of 
    property.' 
        
         In fact, it is perfectly impossible to suppose that, in any 
    change in the measure of value, which ever did, or ever can take 
    place practically, all articles, both foreign and domestic, and 
    all incomes, from whatever source derived, should arrange 
    themselves precisely in the same relative proportions as before. 
    And if they do not, it is quite obvious, that such a change may 
    occasion the most marked differences in the command possessed by 
    individuals and classes of individuals over the produce and 
    wealth of the country. Sometimes the changes of this kind that 
    actually take place, are favourable to the industrious classes of 
    society, and sometimes unfavourable. 
        
         It can scarcely be doubted, that one of the main causes, 
    which has enabled us hitherto to support, with almost 
    undiminished resources, the prodigious weight of debt which has 
    been accumulated during the last twenty years, is the continued 
    depreciation of the measure in which it has been estimated, and 
    the great stimulus to industry, and power of accumulation, which 
    have been given to the industrious classes of society by the 
    progressive rise of prices. As far as this was occasioned by 
    excessive issues of paper, the stockholder was unjustly treated, 
    and the industrious classes of society benefited unfairly at his 
    expense. But, on the other hand, if the price of corn were now to 
    fall to 50 shillings a quarter, and labour and other commodities 
    nearly in proportion, there can be no doubt that the stockholder 
    would be benefited unfairly at the expense of the industrious 
    classes of society, and consequently at the expense of the wealth 
    and prosperity of the whole country. 
        
         During the twenty years, beginning with 1794 and ending with 
    1813, the average price of British corn per quarter was about 83 
    shillings; during the ten years ending with 1813, 92 shillings; 
    and during the last five years of the twenty, 108 shillings. In 
    the course of these twenty years, the government borrowed near 
    £500 millions of real capital, for which on a rough average, 
    exclusive of the sinking fund, it engaged to pay about 5 per 
    cent. But if corn should fall to 50 shillings a quarter, and 
    other commodities in proportion, instead of an interest of about 
    5 per cent the government would really pay an interest of 7, 8, 
    9, and for the last £200 millions, 10 per cent. 
        
         To this extraordinary generosity towards the stockholders, I 
    should be disposed to make no kind of objection, if it were not 
    necessary to consider by whom it is to be paid; and a moment's 
    reflection will show us, that it can only be paid by the 
    industrious classes of society and the landlords, that is, by all 
    those whose nominal incomes will vary with the variations in the 
    measure of value. The nominal revenues of this part of the 
    society, compared with the average of the last five years, will 
    be diminished one half; and out of this nominally reduced income, 
    they will have to pay the same nominal amount of taxation. 
        
         The interest and charges of the national debt, including the 
    sinking fund, are now little short of £40 millions a year; and 
    these £40 millions, if we completely succeed in the reduction of 
    the price of corn and labour, are to be paid in future from a 
    revenue of about half the nominal value of the national income in 
    1813. 
        
         If we consider, with what an increased weight the taxes on 
    tea, sugar, malt, leather, soap, candles, etc., etc. would in 
    this case bear on the labouring classes of society, and what 
    proportion of their incomes all the active, industrious middle 
    orders of the state, as well as the higher orders, must pay in 
    assessed taxes, and the various articles of the customs and 
    excise, the pressure will appear to be absolutely intolerable. 
    Nor would even the ad valorem taxes afford any real relief. The 
    annual £40 millions, must at all events be paid; and if some 
    taxes fail, others must be imposed that will be more productive. 
        
         These are considerations sufficient to alarm even the 
    stockholders themselves. indeed, if the measure of value were 
    really to fall, as we have supposed, there is great reason to 
    fear that the country would be absolutely unable to continue the 
    payment of the present interest of the national debt. 
        
         I certainly do not think, that by opening our ports to the 
    freest admission of foreign corn, we shall lower the price to 50 
    shillings a quarter. I have already given my reasons for 
    believing that the fluctuations which in the present state of 
    Europe, a system of importation would bring with it, would be 
    often producing dear years, and throwing us back again upon our 
    internal resources. But still there is no doubt whatever, that a 
    free influx of foreign grain would in all commonly favourable 
    seasons very much lower its price. 
        
         Let us suppose it lowered to 60 shillings a quarter, which 
    for periods of three or four years together is not improbable. 
    The difference between a measure of value at 60 compared with 80 
    (the price at which it is proposed to fix the importation), is 33 
    1/3 per cent. This percentage upon £40 millions amounts to a very 
    formidable sum. But let us suppose that corn does not effectually 
    regulate the prices of other commodities; and, making allowances 
    on this account, let us take only 25, or even 20 per cent. Twenty 
    per cent upon £40 millions amounts at once to £8 millions - a sum 
    which ought to go a considerable way towards a peace 
    establishment; but which, in the present case, must go to pay the 
    additional interest of the national debt, occasioned by the 
    change in the measure of value. And even if the price of corn be 
    kept up by restrictions to 80 shillings a quarter, it is certain 
    that the whole of the loans made during the war just terminated, 
    will on an average, be paid at an interest very much higher than 
    they were contracted for; which increased interest can, of 
    course, only be furnished by the industrious classes of society. 
        
         I own it appears to me that the necessary effect of a change 
    in the measure of value on the weight of a large national debt is 
    alone sufficient to make the question fundamentally different 
    from that of a simple question about a free or restricted trade; 
    and, that to consider it merely in this light, and to draw our 
    conclusions accordingly, is to expect the same results from 
    premises which have essentially changed their nature. From this 
    review of the manner in which the different classes of society 
    will be affected by the opening of our ports, I think it appears 
    clearly, that very much the largest mass of the people, and 
    particularly of the industrious orders of the state, will be more 
    injured than benefited by the measure. 
        
         I have now stated the grounds on which it appears to me to be 
    wise and politic, in the actual circumstances of the country, to 
    restrain the free importation of foreign corn. 
        
         To put some stop to the progressive loss of agricultural 
    capital, which is now taking place, and which it will be by no 
    means easy to recover, it might be advisable to pass a temporary 
    act of restriction, whatever may be the intention of the 
    legislature in future. But, certainly it is much to be wished 
    that as soon as possible, consistently with due deliberation, the 
    permanent policy intended to be adopted with regard to the trade 
    in corn should be finally settled. Already, in the course of 
    little more than a century, three distinct changes in this policy 
    have taken place. The act of William, which gave the bounty, 
    combined with the prohibitory act of Charles II was founded 
    obviously and strikingly upon the principle of encouraging 
    exportation and discouraging importation; the spirit of the 
    regulations adopted in 1773, and acted upon some time before, was 
    nearly the reverse, and encouraged importation and discouraged 
    exportation. Subsequently, as if alarmed at the dependence of the 
    country upon foreign corn, and the fluctuations of price which it 
    had occasioned, the legislature in a feeble act of 1791, and 
    rather a more effective one in 1804, returned again to the policy 
    of restrictions. And if the act of 1804 be left now unaltered, it 
    may be fairly said that a fourth change has taken place; as it is 
    quite certain that, to proceed consistently upon a restrictive 
    system, fresh regulations become absolutely necessary to keep 
    pace with the progressive fall in the value of currency. 
        
         Such changes in the spirit of our legislative enactments are 
    much to be deprecated; and with a view to a greater degree of 
    steadiness in future, it is quite necessary that we should be so 
    fully prepared for the consequences which belong to each system, 
    as not to have our determinations shaken by them, when they 
    occur. 
        
         If, upon mature deliberation, we determine to open our ports 
    to the free admission of foreign grain, we must not be disturbed 
    at the depressed state, and diminished produce of our home 
    cultivation; we must not be disturbed at our becoming more and 
    more dependent upon other nations for the main support of our 
    population; we must not be disturbed at the greatly increased 
    pressure of the national debt upon the national industry; and we 
    must not be disturbed at the fluctuations of price, occasioned by 
    the very variable supplies, which we shall necessarily receive 
    from France, in the actual state of her laws, or by the 
    difficulty and expense of procuring large, and sudden imports 
    from the Baltic, when our wants are pressing. These consequences 
    may all be distinctly foreseen. Upon all general principles, they 
    belong to the opening of our ports, in the actual state and 
    relations of this country to the other countries of Europe; and 
    though they may be counterbalanced or more than counterbalanced, 
    by other advantages, they cannot, in the nature of things, be 
    avoided. 
        
         On the other hand, if, on mature deliberation, we determine 
    steadily to pursue a system of restrictions with regard to the 
    trade in corn, we must not be disturbed at a progressive rise in 
    the price of grain; we must not be disturbed at the necessity of 
    altering, at certain intervals, our restrictive laws according to 
    the state of the currency, and the value of the precious metals; 
    we must not be disturbed at the progressive diminution of fixed 
    incomes; and we must not be disturbed at the occasional loss or 
    diminution of a continental market for some of our least peculiar 
    manufactures, owing to the high price of our labour.(17*) All 
    these disadvantages may be distinctly foreseen. According to all 
    general principles they strictly belong to the system adopted; 
    and, though they may be counterbalanced, and more than 
    counterbalanced, by other greater advantages, they cannot, in the 
    nature of things, be avoided, if we continue to increase in 
    wealth and population. 
        
         Those who promise low prices upon the restrictive system, 
    take an erroneous view of the causes which determine the prices 
    of raw produce, and draw an incorrect inference from the 
    experience of the first half of the last century. As I have 
    stated in another place,(18*) a nation which very greatly gets 
    the start of its neighbours in riches, without any peculiar 
    natural facilities for growing corn, must necessarily submit to 
    one of these alternatives - either a very high comparative price 
    of grain, or a very great dependence upon other countries for it. 
        
         With regard to the specific mode of regulating the 
    importation of corn, if the restrictive system be adopted, I am 
    not sufficiently acquainted with the details of the subject to be 
    able to speak with confidence. It seems to be generally agreed, 
    that, in the actual state of things, a price of about eighty 
    shillings a quarter(19*) would prevent our cultivation from 
    falling back, and perhaps allow it to be progressive. But, in 
    future, we should endeavour, if possible, to avoid all 
    discussions about the necessity of protecting the British farmer, 
    and securing to him a fair living profit. Such language may 
    perhaps be allowable in a crisis like the present. But certainly 
    the legislature has nothing to do with securing to any classes of 
    its subjects a particular rate of profits in their different 
    trades. This is not the province of a government; and it is 
    unfortunate that any language should be used which may convey 
    such an impression, and make people believe that their rulers 
    ought to listen to the accounts of their gains and losses. 
        
         But a government may certainly see sufficient reasons for 
    wishing to secure an independent supply of grain. This is a 
    definite, and may be a desirable, object, of the same nature as 
    the Navigation Act; and it is much to be wished, that this 
    object, and not the interests of farmers and landlords, should be 
    the ostensible, as well as the real, end which we have in view, 
    in all our inquiries and proceedings relating to the trade in 
    corn. 
        
         I firmly believe that, in the actual state of Europe, and 
    under the actual circumstances of our present situation, it is 
    our wisest policy to grow our own average supply of corn; and, in 
    so doing, I feel persuaded that the country has ample resources 
    for a great and continued increase of population, of power, of 
    wealth, and of happiness. 

    NOTES: 

    1. Some of my friends were of different opinions as to the side, 
    towards which my arguments most inclined. This I consider as a 
    tolerably fair proof of impartiality. 

    2. Mercantile losses are always comparatively partial; but the 
    present losses, occasioned by the unusual combination of low 
    prices, and scanty produce, must inflict a severe blow upon the 
    whole mass of cultivators. There never, perhaps, was known a year 
    more injurious to the interests of agriculture. 

    3. At the same time, I certainly now very much wish that some 
    regulation had been adopted last year. It would have saved the 
    nation a great loss of agricultural capital, which it will take 
    some time to recover. But it was impossible to foresee such a 
    year as the present -- such a combination, as a very bad harvest, 
    and very low prices. 

    4. I have very little doubt that the value of paper in this 
    country has already risen, norwithstanding the increased issues 
    of the Bank. These increased issues I attribute chiefly to the 
    great failures which have taken place among country banks, and 
    the very great purchases which have been made for the continental 
    markets, and, under these circumstances, increased issues might 
    take place, accompanied even by a rise of value. But the currency 
    has not yet recovered itself. The real exchange, during the last 
    year, must have been greatly in our favour, although the nominal 
    exchange is considerably against us. This shows, 
    incontrovertibly, that our currency is still depreciated, in 
    reference to the bullion currencies of the continent. A part, 
    however, of this depreciation may still be owing to the value of 
    bullion in Europe not having yet fallen to its former level. 

    5. Calculated at twenty four livres the pound sterling. 

    6. It has been supposed by some, that this law cannot, and will 
    not be executed: but I own I see no grounds for such an opinion. 
    It is difficult to execute prohibitions against the exportation 
    of corn, when it is in great plenty, but not when it is scarce. 
    For ten years before 1757, we had in this country, regularly 
    exported on an average, above 400,000 quarters of wheat, and in 
    that year there was at once an excess of importation. With regard 
    to the alleged impotence of governments in this respect, it 
    appears to me that facts show their power rather than their 
    weakness. To be convinced of this, it is only necessary to look 
    at the diminished importations from America during the war, and 
    particularly from the Baltic after Bonaparte's decrees. The 
    imports from France and the Baltic in 1810, were by special 
    licences, granted for purposes of revenue. Such licences showed 
    strength rather than weakness; and might have been refused, if a 
    greater object than revenue had at that time presented itself. 

    7. The average is 16 francs, 21 centimes, the hectolitre. The 
    hectolitre is about 1/20th less than 3 Winchester bushels, which 
    makes the English quarter come to about 38 shillings. 

    8. It appears from the evidence, that the corn from the Baltic is 
    often very heavily taxed, and that this tax is generally raised 
    in proportion to our necessities. In a scarce year in this 
    country we could never get any considerable quantity of corn from 
    the Baltic, without paying an enormous price for it. 

    9. By the real growing price of corn I mean the real quantity of 
    labour and capital which has been employed to procure the last 
    additions which have been made to the national produce. In every 
    rich and improving country there is a natural and strong tendency 
    to a constantly increasing price of raw produce, owing to the 
    necessity of employing, progressively, land of an inferior 
    quality. But this tendency may be partially counteracted by great 
    improvements in cultivation, and economy of labour. See this 
    subject treated in An inquiry into the nature and progress of 
    rent, just published. 

    10. Sir John Sinclair, An account of the systems of husbandry 
    adopted in the more improved districts of Scotland (Edinburgh, 
    1812), and General report of the agricultural state and political 
    circumstances of Scotland, 4 vols. (Edinburgh, 1814). 

    11. Above, pp. 83-109 and 111-45. 

    12. I was not prepared to expect (as I intimated in the 
    Observations) so sudden a fall in the price of labour as has 
    already taken place. This fall has been occasioned, not so much 
    by the low price of corn, as by the sudden stagnation of 
    agricultural work, occasioned by a more sudden check to 
    cultivation than I foresaw. 

    13. I am strongly disposed to believe, that it is owning to the 
    unwillingness of governments to allow the free egress of their 
    corn, when it is scarce, that nations are practically so little 
    dependent upon each other for corn, as they are found to be. 
    According to all general principles they ought to be more 
    dependent. But the great fluctuations in the price of corn, 
    occasioned by this unwillingness, tend to throw each country back 
    again upon its internal resources. This was remarkably the case 
    with us in 1800 and 1801, when the very high price, which we paid 
    for foreign corn, gave a prodigious stimulus to our domestic 
    agriculture. A large territorial country, that imports foreign 
    corn, is exposed not infrequently to the fluctuations which 
    belong to this kind of variable dependence, without obtaining the 
    cheapness that ought to accompany a trade in corn really free. 

    14. See this subject treated in Malthus, Nature and Progress of 
    Rent. 

    15. Malthus, Nature and progress of rent. 

    16. It is to this class of persons that I consider myself as 
    chiefly belonging. Much the greatest part of my income is derived 
    from a fixed salary and the interest of money in the funds. 

    17. It often happens that the high prices of a particular country 
    may diminish the quantity of its exports without diminishing the 
    value of their amount abroad; in which case its foreign trade is 
    peculiarly advantageous, as it purchases the same amount of 
    foreign commodities at a much less expense of labour and capital. 

    18. Malthus, Nature and progress of rent. 

    19. This price seems to be pretty fairly consistent with the idea 
    of getting rid of that part of our high prices which belongs to 
    excessive issues of paper, and retaining only that part which 
    belongs to great wealth, combined with a system of restrictions.


    Last updated July, 1997.