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Delving Into Democracy's ShadowsThe sociologist Michael
Mann took a detour from his epic study of power in human history. It
led him straight to the horrors at the center of modern life.
By SCOTT
MCLEMEE
Scholarly books often
resemble the pyramids erected for minor officials in ancient Egypt.
Impressive in their way -- and built to last -- they are,
nonetheless, difficult to tell apart. By contrast, The Sources of
Social Power, by Michael Mann, a professor of sociology at the
University of California at Los Angeles and a visiting research
professor at Queens University Belfast, is "audacious in scope,
ambitious in objective, and provocative in challenge," as the
American Sociological Association put it in presenting Mr. Mann its
1988 award for distinguished scholarly publication.
The work
begins with the dawn of civilization in Mesopotamia, charting the
emergence of four distinct forms of power (ideological, military,
economic, and political) that Mr. Mann finds operating throughout
recorded history. The second volume, appearing in 1993, extended the
analysis up to the outbreak of the First World War. A review in
The Journal of Economic History began, simply, "Colossal!"
Scholars often mention Max Weber's Economy and Society
(1914), another work routinely called monumental, when discussing
Mr. Mann's work.
But the edifice remains, as yet, unfinished
-- because the 20th century turned out to be a nightmare. "As
soon as I completed volume two," Mr. Mann says, "I began to write
volume three, which continues the story from 1914 up to the present
day. I spent a year in Spain, working at an institute with a
wonderful library on fascism," he recalls. "So I began to write a
chapter on fascism. That turned into a book in its own
right."
He refers to Fascists, published by Cambridge
in July, a comparative analysis of how fascist movements developed
in half a dozen European countries between the World Wars. His
research also drove Mr. Mann "to write about the Holocaust, about
what the worst fascists did when in power" -- which led him, in
turn, to study the more recent killing fields of Cambodia, Rwanda,
and the Balkans. His contribution to the field of study now known as
"comparative genocide" is forthcoming from Cambridge in November as
The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic
Cleansing.
At a time when pundits wax at length on the
idea that economic globalization has undermined the old ideal of
national sovereignty, Mr. Mann offers a very different view of the
world. The ideal of the nation-state crystallized over the course of
centuries, he says, and has taken root everywhere. It will not soon
vanish. Mr. Mann interprets fascism as "merely the most extreme
form" of "nation-statism."
His thesis in The Dark Side of
Democracy is, if anything, more troubling: the extension of
democracy throughout the world carries the seeds (if by no means the
certainty) of mass murder.
Order, but No
Law
Mr. Mann's sweeping vision of historical sociology
does not boil down to formulas about the rise and fall of
civilizations. (Any resemblance between his books and Oswald
Spengler's Decline of the West or Arnold Toynbee's A Study
of History is strictly at the level of ambition and heft.)
"No laws are possible in sociology," he wrote in the first
volume of his magnum opus, "… for the number of cases is far smaller
than the number of variables effecting the outcome." But Mr. Mann
imposes some analytic order on what he calls "the patterned
confusion" of human history by distinguishing four general
categories of power operating at any given time -- the
ideological, economic, military, and political
forms.
Economic power derives from, as Mr. Mann puts it, "the
human need to extract, transform, distribute, and consume the
resources of nature for sustenance." It is distinct from political
power ("the control of the state") and ideological power (basically,
the myths and rituals that give human beings access to a sense of
ultimate meaning). Each form of power is channeled through its own
network of institutions. "In particular historical phases or
periods," says Mr. Mann, "one source of social power may well be
primary. "But over all, I don't think that general relations of
primacy can be asserted. In that sense, I'm Weberian, rather than
Marxian."
Mr. Mann goes one step beyond Max Weber, however
-- questioning the German theorist's classic definition of the
state as the institution possessing "a monopoly on legitimate
violence." For Mr. Mann distinguishes military power ("the social
organization of physical violence") as a distinct force, with its
own institutions and norms. "In principle, all well organized
militaries could seize state power," he notes, "but only a few
actually do."
The ordinary citizen may be justifiably
relieved to hear that. Sociologists would do well to ponder it as an
intriguing paradox. Mr. Mann complains, however, that they have
tended to neglect the military and warfare as important factors in
social structure. Until the rise of industrialism, he notes,
economic exchange usually occurred over short geographical
distances. "Large areas and diverse peoples" became integrated
largely through the force of arms. Other scholars commenting on Mr.
Mann's work have pointed to his emphasis on military power as one of
his most important contributions.
The Grid and the
Cage
A four-dimensional model of power sounds abstract,
even rather bloodless. In practice, though, Mr. Mann is
unrelentingly empirical. He wields "the IEMP grid" (as some have
dubbed his four-pronged approach) to integrate a wide range of
specialist work by other scholars -- to which he adds his own
crunchings of econometric data, for centuries for which it was
available. Each of the forms of power he studies corresponds to
networks of institutions that interlink with, struggle against, and
shape one another. The result is a set of grand narratives of
history that Randall Collins, a professor of sociology at the
University of Pennsylvania, has called "our contemporary standard of
knowledge" on several topics.
The energy really starts to
flow through the IEMP grid when Mr. Mann analyzes the rise of the
nation-state. It was not simply a matter of local markets
integrating, over time, into national economies -- which then
(under catchy slogans like "no taxation without representation!")
reshaped the state to defend the interests of business. All of that
did happen. But at the same time, new forms of military organization
required the integration of large numbers of conscripts. People
whose sense of identity once came from belonging to a particular
village came to understand themselves as citizens of the same
nation.
As each form of social power in his theoretical grid
developed, says Mr. Mann, it generated its own vested interests. The
revenues raised through taxation could be used not only to finance
the military but to build roads, schools, and other public services
-- giving the state "infrastructural power" in addition to its
military control over territory. That growing infrastructure then
reinforced economic growth. Meanwhile, the sense of national
identity itself became a kind of ideological power, embodied in
education, media, and the political organizations that sought to
control the state.
As a result, all of these interests
increasingly intersect to create what he calls the "cage" of the
nation-state. It is a term with important overtones in classic
social theory, calling to mind Weber's sense that modern life
unfolds within an "iron cage of bureacracy."
By the early
20th century, nation-statism was an almost unquestioned fact of life
in Europe and the United States. And the emergence of numerous
successful anti-colonial movements showed that it had been exported
throughout the world as well.
Street Fighting
Men
In Fascists, Mr. Mann contends that the rise
of right-wing authoritarian movements between the world wars can
best be understood as, in effect, nation-statism forging not a cage
but a concentration camp. His analysis puts him at odds with the
Marxist interpretation of fascism, which treats it as a violent
effort to preserve capitalism from the challenge of left-wing
mobilizations following World War I. Mr. Mann also rejects efforts
to treat fascism as a totalitarian "political religion" emerging in
reaction against modernization and democracy.
All of Europe
underwent severe economic crisis in the period between the wars, he
notes. But fascists made no serious bid for power in countries where
the state had both well-established institutions of representative
democracy and a solid basis of infrastructural power. In England,
for example, the black-shirted members of Oswald Mosley's British
Union of Fascists were exotic and attention-grabbing, but
ineffectual at much besides outbursts of street
hooliganism.
Mr. Mann focuses on the countries where fascism
did become a mass movement that either took control or strongly
influenced the state: Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and
Spain. In each case, he contends, state power was divided between an
established and narrowly based group (for example, landowners) and a
new, relatively inexperienced set of parliamentary institutions. Mr.
Mann calls this formation a "semi-authoritarian, semi-liberal
state." Fascist movements were similarly hybrid. While the cult of
national glory and calls for organic community might sound
conservative, Mr. Mann observes that fascist movements also
recruited on the basis of frustration with the slow pace of
political elites in creating the infrastructure to provide basic
services to the population.
Proto-fascist ideas began
circulating among small groups of intellectuals throughout Europe in
the late 19th century, but the movement took off in the 1920s,
pulling in young men who had gone through the experience of "total
war." Fascist movements always created paramilitary organizations,
Mr. Mann says. But most of them also placed great emphasis on
electioneering -- and proved very good at it. The fascists were
enemies of democracy in the abstract, but devoted to mobilizing mass
participation in ways that were often anathema to old-fashioned
"conservative authoritarians."
Mr. Mann also says that "the
degree of capitalist support for fascist movements … varied
considerably between the different countries." What was consistent,
however, was that the core fascist constituencies had strong vested
interests in the growth and dynamism of the nation-state. "Soldiers
and veterans above all, but also civil servants, teachers, and
public-sector manual workers were all disproportionately fascist in
almost all the countries of mass fascism," he writes. Students, too,
were always heavily represented.
Hungary vs.
Romania
Mr. Mann contends that, important as economic
factors were, they are insufficient to understanding the movement.
Consider the contrast between Hungary and Romania. "Hungary had
probably the worst middle-class job prospects, Romania the best,"
writes Mr. Mann, "yet both produced fascism among those most
affected, students and public-sector workers." He also notes that in
both countries fascists "recruited more from proletarian than
bourgeois backgrounds."
In Mr. Mann's analysis, fascism
appealed not only to people seeking to preserve the status quo, or
retreat to an early form of social order, but also to those who
wanted modernization to continue under the firm hand of the
nation-state.
The defeat of fascism on the battlefield in
1945 also meant its demise as a political force in Europe, says Mr.
Mann. Authoritarian and xenophobic parties have sometimes won
parliamentary representation. But no movement has had the
combination of paramilitary and electoral support typical of fascism
in the 1920s and '30s. "Institutionalized liberal democracy," as he
puts it, "is proof against fascism." While currents embodying
aggressive strands of nation-statism may yet emerge in Eastern
Europe or the Russian federation, the requirement of democracy for
entry into the European Union "has remained influential."
But
that does not mean that Mr. Mann is quite ready to join Francis
Fukuyama in celebrating liberal democracy as the end of history. In
his forthcoming book, The Dark Side of Democracy, Mr. Mann
contends that nation-statism and ethnic cleansing are intertwined in
ways that make the spread of democracy problematic.
Ethnic
violence existed before the rise of the nation-state. Still, Mr.
Mann says it tended to be limited and instrumental. Killing was a
means by which one group subjugated another, whether to enslave it
(thereby integrating it into the conqueror's economic system) or to
convert it (thus extending a religion's ideological power grid).
He sees violence used to drive an ethnic group out of a
state, or to destroy it, as a relatively new thing in history
-- and one closely associated with the emergence of democratic
forms of political organization.
He points to the contrast
between European colonies under authoritarian rule and those in
which the settlers could control local institutions. In Spanish and
Portuguese colonies, the use of violence by authoritarian
governments tended to be limited. "Stable authoritarian regimes,"
says Mr. Mann, "tend to govern by divide and rule, balancing the
demands of powerful groups, including ethnic ones." But the
transition to democracy tends to unleash ethnic cleansing. "When
settlers in North American and Australian states and colonies
acquired de facto and de jure self-
government," he says,
"murder also increased."
Mr. Mann makes a similar point about
Rwanda. Between 1973 and 1994, the dictatorship of President
Habyarima, a Hutu, was certainly oppressive to the Tutsi minority.
But it also "somewhat restrained ethnic violence." In the early
1990s -- amidst an influx of Tutsi from Uganda -- the
Rwandan government moved toward a multiparty, constitutional
democracy. This shift accelerated the transformation of ethnic
tensions into attempted extermination. In April 1994, Hutus were
slaughtering Tutsis in an organized campaign of genocide at a rate
of almost 300 per hour.
Power to the People
The
problem, says Mr. Mann, comes from a fateful ambiguity at the heart
of democracy -- "rule by the people," as the Greek source of
the term has it. But within a nation-state, "the people" tends not
to mean simply "the ordinary citizens," but those sharing a distinct
culture -- an "ethnos." In a nation-state that is authoritarian
but stable, ethnic violence may be routine, but it tends not to
involve struggle for control of political power.
With
democratization, however, the stakes increase. Ethnic nationalism
proves strongest, and most deadly, when one group feels economically
exploited or threatened by another. (In Rwanda, for example, Tutsis
tended to be more prosperous than the Hutus.) Mr. Mann lists a
series of steps through which the tensions may reach a brink
-- at which point, in the name of democracy, ordinary people
seek to purify the nation-state of any ethnic
"contamination."
In calling genocidal violence "the dark side
of democracy," Mr. Mann says he is not denouncing the institutions
of the democratic nation-state itself. The demos need not be
confused with, or limited to, one ethnos. The diversity of
citizens is something, he writes, "which liberalism recognizes as
central to democracy."
But according to David D. Laitin, a
professor of political science at Stanford University, Mr. Mann
"uses his erudition and keenness of subtle argument to cloud social
reality rather than to clarify it." In a paper to appear in An
Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann, forthcoming
next year from Cambridge University Press, Mr. Laitin contends that
"the culprit" in genocide "is not democracy, but a form of politics
that uses words similar to [those employed by] democrats, but in a
different semantic sense."
Mr. Laitin also suggests that the
argument of The Dark Side of Democracy itself rests on a kind
of basic confusion. "Mann implies that because democracy and
genocide are both modern, they implicate one another," he writes.
"Logically, Mann is incorrectly linking two phenomena that are
temporally but not causally linked. This type of reasoning would
make democracy culpable for world war, AIDS, and rap
music."
Striking Back at the Empire
Mr. Mann is
now back to work on The Sources of Social Power. His long
march through fascism and ethnic cleansing has transformed his sense
of how to approach the 20th century. "I realized, through that, that
I could not write volume three in the same detailed, empirical way
that I'd written the first two. There's too much material, too much
scholarship. Fascism was only one of a half-dozen topics for the
20th century, and I'd ended up writing a whole book about
it."
Instead, he says, the third volume will offer "a mixture
of historical narrative and conceptual analysis. There's a section
on empire. There's one on the development of capitalism, and on the
difference that wars and ideologies have made to it. The theme of
globalization has always been there, and it comes to fruition in a
section on the post-World War II period." In fact, the third volume
will be called Globalizations. (Mann is considering a fourth
volume in the series, which he describes as a theoretical summation
of the project.)
The plural in that title is in keeping with
the IEMP framework -- for Mr. Mann is very skeptical of ideas
about a monolithic "world system" of capitalist development. "The
expansion of the economy," he says, "has been paralleled by the
expansion of the nation-state system, of wars, and of ideologies.
These are not the same thing. They don't link together to
form a global system." The different forms of globalization
"sometimes produce major contradiction," he says. "More often, they
produce disjunctions, because they're completely different, rather
than contradictory."
In the months leading up to the Iraq
war, Mr. Mann took another detour from the third volume -- long
enough to write Incoherent Empire (Verso, 2003), a scathing
criticism of the idea that the United States can impose a Pax
Americana upon the world. Quoting the White House's oft-repeated
estimate that 100,000 international terrorists were trained by Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan, Mr. Mann points out that most radical
Islamists concentrate on struggles to dominate their own countries,
rather than on exporting terrorism.
"The age of empires is
over," says Mr. Mann. "We're in the age of nation-states, for better
or worse."
A MANN AND HIS
WORK
Michael Mann, who
holds dual British and U.S. citizenship, received his B.A. in modern
history from the University of Oxford in 1963 and his D.Phil. in
sociology from the same institution in 1971.
A professor of sociology at the University of California at
Los Angeles since 1987, Mr. Mann was a reader in sociology at the
London School of Economics and Political Science from 1977 to
1987.
In addition to the first two
volumes of The Sources of Social Power (which appeared in
1986 and 1993), Mr. Mann's books include:
- Workers on the Move: The Sociology of Relocation
(Cambridge University Press, 1973)
- States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political
Sociology (Blackwell, 1988)
- Incoherent Empire (Verso, 2003)
- Fascists (Cambridge University Press, July 2004).
His next book, The Dark Side of
Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, will be published by
Cambridge University Press in November 2004. He is also the editor
of A Student Encyclopedia of Sociology (Macmillan, 1983), to
which he contributed 20 entries.
http://chronicle.com Section: Research & Publishing Volume
51, Issue 4, Page A10
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