British philosopher and sociologist,
Herbert Spencer was a major figure in the intellectual life of
the Victorian era. He was one of the principal proponents of
evolutionary theory in the mid nineteenth century, and his
reputation at the time rivaled that of Charles Darwin. Spencer
was initially best known for developing and applying
evolutionary theory to philosophy, psychology and the study of
society -- what he called his "synthetic philosophy" (see his
A System of Synthetic Philosophy, 1862-93). Today,
however, he is usually remembered in philosophical circles for
his political thought, primarily for his defense of natural
rights and for criticisms of utilitarian positivism, and his
views have been invoked by 'libertarian' thinkers such as
Robert Nozick.
Table of Contents
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1. Life
Spencer was born in Derby, England on 27 April 1820, the
eldest of nine children, but the only one to survive infancy.
He was the product of an undisciplined, largely informal
education. His father, George, was a school teacher, but an
unconventional man, and Spencer's family were Methodist
'Dissenters,' with Quaker sympathies. From an early age,
Herbert was strongly influenced by the individualism and the
anti-establishment and anti-clerical views of his father, and
the Benthamite radical views of his uncle Thomas. Indeed,
Spencer's early years showed a good deal of resistance to
authority and independence.
A person of eclectic interests, Spencer eventually trained
as a civil engineer for railways but, in his early 20s, turned
to journalism and political writing. He was initially an
advocate of many of the causes of philosophic radicalism and
some of his ideas (e.g., the definition of 'good' and 'bad' in
terms of their pleasurable or painful consequences, and his
adoption of a version of the 'greatest happiness principle')
show similarities to utilitarianism.
From 1848 to 1853, Spencer worked as a writer and subeditor
for The Economist financial weekly and, as a result,
came into contact with a number of political controversialists
such as George Henry Lewes, Thomas Carlyle, Lewes' future
lover George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans [1819-1880])--with whom
Spencer had himself had a lengthy (though purely intellectual)
association--and T.H. Huxley (1825-1895). Despite the
diversity of opinions to which he was exposed, Spencer's
unquestioning confidence in his own views was coupled with a
stubbornness and a refusal to read authors with whom he
disagreed.
In his early writings, Spencer defended a number of radical
causes-- particularly on land nationalization, the extent to
which economics should reflect a policy of
laissez-faire, and the place and role of women in
society--though he came to abandon most of these causes later
in his life.
In 1851 Spencer's first book, Social Statics, or the
Conditions Essential to Human Happiness appeared. ('Social
statics'--the term was borrowed from Auguste Comte--deals with
the conditions of social order, and was preliminary to a study
of human progress and evolution--i.e., 'social dynamics.') In
this work, Spencer presents an account of the development of
human freedom and a defense of individual liberties, based on
a (Lamarckian-style) evolutionary theory.
Upon the death of his uncle Thomas, in 1853, Spencer
received a small inheritance which allowed him to devote
himself to writing without depending on regular employment.
In 1855, Spencer published his second book, The
Principles of Psychology. As in Social Statics,
Spencer saw Bentham and Mill as major targets, though in the
present work he focussed on criticisms of the latter's
associationism. (Spencer later revised this work, and Mill
came to respect some of Spencer's arguments.) The
Principles of Psychology was much less successful than
Social Statics, however, and about this time Spencer
began to experience serious (predominantly mental) health
problems that affected him for the rest of his life. This led
him to seek privacy, and he increasingly avoided appearing in
public. Although he found that, because of his ill health, he
could write for only a few hours each day, he embarked upon a
lengthy project--the nine-volume A System of Synthetic
Philosophy (1862- 93)--which provided a systematic account
of his views in biology, sociology, ethics and politics. This
'synthetic philosophy' brought together a wide range of data
from the various natural and social sciences and organized it
according to the basic principles of his evolutionary theory.
Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy was initially
available only through private subscription, but he was also a
contributor to the leading intellectual magazines and
newspapers of his day. His fame grew with his publications,
and he counted among his admirers both radical thinkers and
prominent scientists, including John Stuart Mill and the
physicist, John Tyndall. In the 1860s and 1870s, for example,
the influence of Spencer's evolutionary theory was on a par
with that of Charles Darwin.
In 1883 Spencer was elected a corresponding member of
philosophical section of the French academy of moral and
political sciences. His work was also particularly influential
in the United States, where his book, The Study of
Sociology, was at the center of a controversy (1879-80) at
Yale University between a professor, William Graham Sumner,
and the University's president, Noah Porter. Spencer's
influence extended into the upper echelons of American society
and it has been claimed that, in 1896, "three justices of the
Supreme Court were avowed 'Spencerians'." His reputation was
at its peak in the 1870s and early 1880s, and he was nominated
for the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1902. Spencer, however,
declined most of the honors he was given.
Spencer's health significantly deteriorated in the last two
decades of his life, and he died in relative seclusion,
following a long illness, on December 8, 1903.
Within his lifetime, some one million copies of his books
had been sold, his work had been translated into French,
German, Spanish, Italian, and Russian, and his ideas were
popular in a number of other countries such as Poland (e.g.,
through the work of the positivist, Wladyslaw Kozlowski).
Nevertheless, by the end of his life, his political views were
no longer as popular as they had once been, and the dominant
currents in liberalism allowed for a more interventionist
state.
2. Method
Spencer's method is, broadly speaking, scientific and
empirical, and it was influenced significantly by the
positivism of Auguste Comte. Because of the empirical
character of scientific knowledge and because of his
conviction that that which is known--biological life--is in a
process of evolution, Spencer held that knowledge is subject
to change. Thus, Spencer writes, "In science the important
thing is to modify and change one's ideas as science
advances." As scientific knowledge was primarily empirical,
however, that which was not 'perceivable' and could not be
empirically tested could not be known. (This emphasis on the
knowable as perceivable led critics to charge that Spencer
fails to distinguish perceiving and conceiving.) Nevertheless,
Spencer was not a skeptic.
Spencer's method was also synthetic. The purpose of each
science or field of investigation was to accumulate data and
to derive from these phenomena the basic principles or laws or
'forces' which gave rise to them. To the extent that such
principles conformed to the results of inquiries or
experiments in the other sciences, one could have explanations
that were of a high degree of certainty. Thus, Spencer was at
pains to show how the evidence and conclusions of each of the
sciences is relevant to, and materially affected by, the
conclusions of the others.
3. Human Nature
In the first volume of A System of Synthetic
Philosophy, entitled First Principles (1862),
Spencer argued that all phenomena could be explained in terms
of a lengthy process of evolution in things. This 'principle
of continuity' was that homogeneous organisms are unstable,
that organisms develop from simple to more complex and
heterogeneous forms, and that such evolution constituted a
norm of progress. This account of evolution provided a
complete and 'predetermined' structure for the kind of
variation noted by Darwin--and Darwin's respect for Spencer
was significant.
But while Spencer held that progress was a necessity, it
was 'necessary' only overall, and there is no teleological
element in his account of this process. In fact, it was
Spencer, and not Darwin, who coined the phrase "survival of
the fittest," though Darwin came to employ the expression in
later editions of the Origin of Species. (That this
view was both ambiguous --for it was not clear whether one had
in mind the 'fittest' individual or species--and far from
universal was something that both figures, however, failed to
address.)
Spencer's understanding of evolution included the
Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of acquired
characteristics and emphasized the direct influence of
external agencies on the organism's development. He denied (as
Darwin had argued) that evolution was based on the
characteristics and development of the organism itself and on
a simple principle of natural selection.
Spencer held that he had evidence for this evolutionary
account from the study of biology (see Principles of
Biology, 2 vols. [1864-7]). He argued that there is a
gradual specialization in things--beginning with biological
organisms--towards self-sufficiency and individuation. Because
human nature can be said to improve and change, then,
scientific--including moral and political-- views that rested
on the assumption of a stable human nature (such as that
presupposed by many utilitarians) had to be rejected. 'Human
nature' was simply "the aggregate of men's instincts and
sentiments" which, over time, would become adapted to social
existence. Spencer still recognized the importance of
understanding individuals in terms of the 'whole' of which
they were 'parts,' but these parts were mutually dependent,
not subordinate to the organism as a whole. They had an
identity and value on which the whole depended--unlike,
Spencer thought, that portrayed by Hobbes.
For Spencer, then, human life was not only on a continuum
with, but was also the culmination of, a lengthy process of
evolution. Even though he allowed that there was a parallel
development of mind and body, without reducing the former to
the latter, he was opposed to dualism and his account of mind
and of the functioning of the central nervous system and the
brain was mechanistic.
Although what characterized the development of organisms
was the 'tendency to individuation' (Social Statics
[1851], p. 436), this was coupled with a natural inclination
in beings to pursue whatever would preserve their lives. When
one examines human beings, this natural inclination was
reflected in the characteristic of rational self-interest.
Indeed, this tendency to pursue one's individual interests is
such that, in primitive societies, at least, Spencer believed
that a prime motivating factor in human beings coming together
was the threat of violence and war.
Paradoxically, perhaps, Spencer held an 'organic' view of
society. Starting with the characteristics of individual
entities, one could deduce, using laws of nature, what would
promote or provide life and human happiness. He believed that
social life was an extension of the life of a natural body,
and that social 'organisms' reflected the same (Lamarckian)
evolutionary principles or laws as biological entities did.
The existence of such 'laws,' then, provides a basis for moral
science and for determining how individuals ought to act and
what would constitute human happiness.
4. Religion
As a result of his view that knowledge about phenomena
required empirical demonstration, Spencer held that we cannot
know the nature of reality in itself and that there was,
therefore, something that was fundamentally "unknowable."
(This included the complete knowledge of the nature of space,
time, force, motion, and substance.)
Since, Spencer claimed, we cannot know anything
non-empirical, we cannot know whether there is a God or what
its character might be. Though Spencer was a severe critic of
religion and religious doctrine and practice--these being the
appropriate objects of empirical investigation and
assessment--his general position on religion was agnostic.
Theism, he argued, cannot be adopted because there is no means
to acquire knowledge of the divine, and there would be no way
of testing it. But while we cannot know whether religious
beliefs are true, neither can we know that (fundamental)
religious beliefs are false.
5. Moral Philosophy
Spencer saw human life on a continuum with, but also as the
culmination of, a lengthy process of evolution, and he held
that human society reflects the same evolutionary principles
as biological organisms do in their development. Society--and
social institutions such as the economy--can, he believed,
function without external control, just as the digestive
system or a lower organism does (though, in arguing this,
Spencer failed to see the fundamental differences between
'higher' and 'lower' levels of social organization). For
Spencer, all natural and social development reflected 'the
universality of law'. Beginning with the 'laws of life', the
conditions of social existence, and the recognition of life as
a fundamental value, moral science can deduce what kinds of
laws promote life and produce happiness. Spencer's ethics and
political philosophy, then, depends on a theory of 'natural
law,' and it is because of this that, he maintained,
evolutionary theory could provide a basis for a comprehensive
political and even philosophical theory.
Given the variations in temperament and character among
individuals, Spencer recognized that there were differences in
what happiness specifically consists in (Social Statics
[1851], p. 5). In general, however, 'happiness' is the surplus
of pleasure over pain, and 'the good' is what contributes to
the life and development of the organism, or--what is much the
same--what provides this surplus of pleasure over pain.
Happiness, therefore, reflects the complete adaptation of an
individual organism to its environment--or, in other words,
'happiness' is that which an individual human being naturally
seeks.
For human beings to flourish and develop, Spencer held that
there must be as few artificial restrictions as possible, and
it is primarily freedom that he, contra Bentham, saw as
promoting human happiness. While progress was an inevitable
characteristic of evolution, it was something to be achieved
only through the free exercise of human faculties (see
Social Statics).
Society, however, is (by definition, for Spencer) an
aggregate of individuals, and change in society could take
place only once the individual members of that society had
changed and developed (The Study of Sociology, pp.
366-367). Individuals are, therefore, 'primary,' individual
development was 'egoistic,' and associations with others
largely instrumental and contractual.
Still, Spencer thought that human beings exhibited a
natural sympathy and concern for one another; there is a
common character and there are common interests among human
beings that they eventually come to recognize as necessary not
only for general, but for individual development. (This
reflects, to an extent, Spencer's organicism.) Nevertheless,
Spencer held that 'altruism' and compassion beyond the family
unit were sentiments that came to exist only recently in human
beings.
Spencer maintained that there was a natural mechanism--an
'innate moral sense'--in human beings by which they come to
arrive at certain moral intuitions and from which laws of
conduct might be deduced (The Principles of Ethics, I
[1892], p. 26). Thus one might say that Spencer held a kind of
'moral sense theory' (Social Statics, pp. 23,
19). (Later in his life, Spencer described these
'principles' of moral sense and of sympathy as the
'accumulated effects of instinctual or inherited
experiences.') Such a mechanism of moral feeling was, Spencer
believed, a manifestation of his general idea of the
'persistence of force.' As this persistence of force was a
principle of nature, and could not be created artificially,
Spencer held that no state or government could promote moral
feeling any more than it could promote the existence of
physical force. But while Spencer insisted that freedom was
the power to do what one desired, he also held that what one
desired and willed was wholly determined by "an infinitude of
previous experiences" (The Principles of Psychology,
pp. 500-502.) Spencer saw this analysis of ethics as
culminating in an 'Absolute Ethics,' the standard for which
was the production of pure pleasure--and he held that the
application of this standard would produce, so far as
possible, the greatest amount of pleasure over pain in the
long run.
Spencer's views here were rejected by Mill and Hartley.
Their principal objection was that Spencer's account of
natural 'desires' was inadequate because it failed to provide
any reason why one ought to have the feelings or
preferences one did.
There is, however, more to Spencer's ethics than this. As
individuals become increasingly aware of their individuality,
they also become aware of the individuality of others and,
thereby, of the law of equal freedom. This 'first
principle' is that 'Every man has freedom to do all that he
wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any
other man' (Social Statics, p. 103). One's 'moral
sense,' then, led to the recognition of the existence of
individual rights, and one can identify strains of a
rights-based ethic in Spencer's writings.
Spencer's views clearly reflect a fundamentally 'egoist'
ethic, but he held that rational egoists would, in the pursuit
of their own self interest, not conflict with one another.
Still, to care for someone who has no direct relation to
oneself--such as supporting the un- and under employed--is,
therefore, not only not in one's self interest, but encourages
laziness and works against evolution. In this sense, at least,
social inequity was explained, if not justified, by
evolutionary principles.
6. Political Philosophy
Despite his egoism and individualism, Spencer held that
life in community was important. Because the relation of parts
to one another was one of mutual dependency, and because of
the priority of the individual 'part' to the collective,
society could not do or be anything other than the sum of its
units. This view is evident, not only in his first significant
major contribution to political philosophy, Social
Statics, but in his later essays--some of which appear in
later editions of The Man versus the State.
As noted earlier, Spencer held an 'organic' view of
society, Nevertheless, as also noted above, he argued that the
natural growth of an organism required 'liberty'--which
enabled him (philosophically) to justify individualism and to
defend the existence of individual human rights. Because of
his commitment to the 'law of equal freedom' and his view that
law and the state would of necessity interfere with it, he
insisted on an extensive policy of laissez faire. For
Spencer, 'liberty' "is to be measured, not by the nature of
the government machinery he lives under [...] but by the
relative paucity of the restraints it imposes on him" (The
Man versus the State [1940], p. 19); the genuine liberal
seeks to repeal those laws that coerce and restrict
individuals from doing as they see fit. Spencer followed
earlier liberalism, then, in maintaining that law is a
restriction of liberty and that the restriction of liberty, in
itself, is evil and justified only where it is necessary to
the preservation of liberty. The only function of government
was to be the policing and protection of individual rights.
Spencer maintained that education, religion, the economy, and
care for the sick or indigent were not to be undertaken by the
state.
Law and public authority have as their general purpose,
therefore, the administration of justice (equated with freedom
and the protection of rights). These issues became the
focus of Spencer's later work in political philosophy and,
particularly, in The Man versus the State. Here,
Spencer contrasts early, classical liberalism with the
liberalism of the 19th century, arguing that it was the
latter, and not the former, that was a "new Toryism"--the
enemy of individual progress and liberty. It is here as
well that Spencer develops an argument for the claim that
individuals have rights, based on a 'law of life'.
(Interestingly, Spencer acknowledges that rights are not
inherently moral, but become so only by one's recognition that
for them to be binding on others the rights of others must be
binding on oneself--this is, in other words, a consequence of
the 'law of equal freedom.') He concluded that everyone had
basic rights to liberty 'in virtue of their constitutions' as
human beings (Social Statics, p. 77), and that such
rights were essential to social progress. (These rights
included rights to life, liberty, property, free speech, equal
rights of women, universal suffrage, and the right 'to ignore
the state'--though Spencer reversed himself on some of these
rights in his later writings.) Thus, the industrious--those of
character, but with no commitment to existing structures
except those which promoted such industry (and, therefore, not
religion or patriotic institutions)--would thrive.
Nevertheless, all industrious individuals, Spencer believed,
would end up being in fundamental agreement.
Not surprisingly, then, Spencer maintained that the
arguments of the early utilitarians on the justification of
law and authority and on the origin of rights were fallacious.
He also rejected utilitarianism and its model of distributive
justice because he held that it rested on an egalitarianism
that ignored desert and, more fundamentally, biological need
and efficiency. Spencer further maintained that the
utilitarian account of the law and the state was also
inconsistent---that it tacitly assumed the existence of claims
or rights that have both moral and legal weight independently
of the positive law. And, finally, Spencer argues as well
against parliamentary, representative government, seeing it as
exhibiting a virtual "divine right"---i.e., claiming that "the
majority in an assembly has power that has no bounds." Spencer
maintained that government action requires not only individual
consent, but that the model for political association should
be that of a "joint stock company", where the 'directors' can
never act for a certain good except on the explicit wishes of
its 'shareholders'. When parliaments attempt to do more than
protect the rights of their citizens by, for example,
'imposing' a conception of the good--be it only on a
minority--Spencer suggested that they are no different from
tyrannies.
7. Assessment
Spencer has been frequently accused of inconsistency; one
finds variations in his conclusions concerning land
nationalization and reform, the rights of children and the
extension of suffrage to women, and the role of government.
Moreover, in recent studies of Spencer's theory of social
justice, there is some debate whether justice is based
primarily on desert or on entitlement, whether the 'law of
equal freedom' is a moral imperative or a descriptive natural
law, and whether the law of equal freedom is grounded on
rights, utility, or, ultimately, on 'moral sense'.
Nevertheless, Spencer's work has frequently been seen as a
model for later 'libertarian' thinkers, such as Robert Nozick,
and he continues to be read--and is often invoked--by
'libertarians' on issues concerning the function of government
and the fundamental character of individual rights.
8. Bibliography
Primary Sources:
The Proper Sphere of Government. London: W. Brittain,
1843.
Social Statics. London: Chapman, 1851.
The Principles of Psychology. London: Longmans, 1855;
2nd edn., 2 vols. London: Williams and Norgate, 1870-2; 3rd
edn., 2 vols. (1890). [A System of Synthetic Philosophy
; v. 4-5]
First Principles. London: Williams and Norgate, 1862;
6th edn., revised, 1904. [A system of Synthetic
Philosophy ; v. 1]
Principles of Biology, 2 vols. London: Williams and
Norgate, 1864, 1867; 2nd edn., 1898-99).[A System of
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The Study of Sociology. New York: D. Appleton, 1874,
[c1873]
The Principles of Sociology. 3 vols. London :
Williams and Norgate, 1882-1898. [A System of Synthetic
Philosophy, v. 6-8] CONTENTS: Vol. 1: pt. 1. The data of
sociology. pt. 2. The inductions of sociology. pt. 3. The
domestic relations; Vol. 2: pt. 4. Ceremonial institutions.
pt. 5. Political institutions; v. 3: pt. 6. Ecclesiastical
institutions. pt. 7. Professional institutions. pt. 8.
Industrial institutions.]
The Man versus the State: containing "The new
Toryism," "The coming slavery," "The sins of legislators," and
"The great political superstition," London : Williams &
Norgate, 1884; with additional essays and an introduction by
Albert Jay Nock. [adds "From freedom to bondage," and "Over-
legislation"] Intro. A.J. Nock. Caldwell, ID: Caxton,
1940.
Spencer, Herbert. The Factors of Organic Evolution.
London: Williams and Norgate, 1887.
Spencer, Herbert. The Principles of Ethics. 2 vols.
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philosophy ; v. 9-10]
An Autobiography. 2 v. London: Williams and Norgate,
1904.
Secondary Sources:
Andreski, S. Herbert Spencer: Structure, Function and
Evolution. London, 1972.
Duncan, David. (ed.) The Life and Letters of Herbert
Spencer. London: Methuen, 1908.
Gray, T.S. The Political Philosophy of Herbert Spencer,
Aldershot: Avebury, 1996.
Jones, G. Social Darwinism and English Thought: The
Interaction between Biological and Social Theory.
Brighton, 1980.
Kennedy, James G. Herbert Spencer. Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1978.
Miller, David. Social Justice. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1976. Ch. 6
Paxton, N.L. George Eliot and Herbert Spencer:
Feminism, Evolutionism, and the Reconstruction of Gender.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Peel, J.D.Y. Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a
Sociologist. London, 1971.
Ritchie, David G. The Principles of State Interference:
Four Essays on the Political Philosophy of Mr Herbert Spencer,
J.S. Mill and T.H. Green. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1891.
Taylor, M.W. Men versus the State: Herbert Spencer and
late Victorian Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University
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Wiltshire, David. The Social and Political Thought of
Herbert Spencer. New York: Oxford, 1978.
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