I originally
created this web site on Weber (pronounced "Vay-bur") in 1996 for my students
in social theory. Most of the paper is fairly standard, it is based on
information and insights from standard texts or through other secondary
sources. My intention in summarizing this information was simply to present
Weber in a fairly coherent and comprehensive manner, using language and
structure for the generalists amongst us.
I do
claim some originality in regard to explaining oligarchy, the rationalization
process, and the difference between formal and substantive rationality
(what I have called "the irrationality factor"). In fact, I expand
on these Weberian themes considerably in my book, Industrializing
America: Understanding Contemporary Society through Classical Sociological
Analysis. (Yes, I know, bad title. If I had a chance to
do it again it would be HyperIndustrialism.) I have found
Weber's ideas on rationalization, the irrationality factor, and sociocultural
evolution, to be particularly difficult to get across to students. Yet
these ideas are at the heart of Weber's sociology and, I believe, central
in understanding contemporary society.
Social
Action
According
to the standard interpretation, Weber conceived of sociology as a comprehensive
science of social action (Aron,
1970; Coser,
1977). His initial theoretical focus is on the subjective meaning
that humans attach to their actions and interactions within specific social
contexts. In this connection, Weber distinguishes between four major
types of social action:
zweckrational
wertrational
affective
action
traditional
action
Zweckrational
can be defined as action in which the means to attain a particular goal
are rationally chosen. It can be roughly translated as "technocratic
thinking." It is often exemplified in the literature by an engineer who
builds a bridge as the most efficient way to cross a river. Perhaps a more
relevant example would be the modern goal of material success sought after
by many young people today. Many recognize that the most efficient way
to attain that success is through higher education, and so they flock to
the universities in order to get a good job (Elwell,
1999).
Wertrational,
or value-oriented rationality, is characterized by striving for a goal
which in itself may not be rational, but which is pursued through rational
means. The values come from within an ethical, religious, philosophical
or even holistic context--they are not rationally "chosen." The traditional
example in the literature is of an individual seeking salvation through
following the teachings of a prophet. A more secular example is of
a person who attends the university because they value the life of the
mind--a value that was instilled in them by parents, previous teachers,
or chance encounter (Elwell,
1999).
Affective
action is based on the emotional state of the person rather than
in the rational weighing of means and ends (Coser,
1977). Sentiments are powerful forces in motivating human behavior.
Attending university for the community life of the fraternity, or following
one's boyfriend to school would be examples.
The
final type Weber labels "traditional action." This is action guided
by custom or habit. People engage in this type of action often unthinkingly,
because it is simply "always done." Many students attend university
because it is traditional for their social class and family to attend--the
expectation was always there, it was never questioned (Elwell,
1999).
Weber's
typology is intended to be a comprehensive list of the types of meaning
men and women give to their conduct across sociocultural systems (Aron,
1970). As an advocate of multiple causation of human behavior, Weber
was well aware that most behavior is caused by a mix of these motivations--university
students, even today, have a variety of reasons for attending. In marketing
themselves to students, university advertising attempts to address (and
encourage) all of these motivations ( though a look at some university
brochures would indicate a clear attempt to focus on the zweckrational
appeal to career aspirations).
But
Weber went further than a mere classification scheme. He developed the
typology because he was primarily concerned with modern society and how
it differs from societies of the past (Aron,
1970; Coser,
1977). He proposed that the basic distinguishing feature of modern
society was a characteristic shift in the motivation of individual behaviors.
In modern society the efficient application of means to ends has come to
dominate and replace other springs of social behavior. His classification
of types of action provides a basis for his investigation of the social
evolutionary process in which behavior had come to be increasingly dominated
by goal-oriented rationality (zweckrational)--less and less by tradition,
values or emotions.
Because
of this focus, Weber is often thought of as an "idealist," one who believes
that ideas and beliefs mold social structure and other material conditions.
But he committed himself to no such narrow interpretation of sociocultural
causation. He believed that this shift in human motivation is one of both
cause and effect occurring in interaction with changes in the structural
organization of society. The major thrust of his work attempts to identify
the factors that have brought about this "rationalization" of the West
(Aron,
1970; Coser,
1977). While his sociology begins with the individual motivators
of social action, Weber does not stay exclusively focused on either the
idealist or the social-psychological level. While he proposed that
the basic distinguishing feature of modern society was best viewed in terms
of this characteristic shift in motivation, he rooted that shift in the
growth of bureaucracy and industrialism.
Ideal
Type
Weber's
discussion of social action is an example of the use of an ideal type.
An ideal type provides the basic method for historical- comparative study.
It is not meant to refer to the "best" or to some moral ideal, but rather
to typical or "logically consistent" features of social institutions or
behaviors. There can be an "ideal type" whore house or a religious
sect, ideal type dictatorship, or an ideal democracy (none of which may
be "ideal" in the colloquial sense of the term) (Gerth
and Mills, 1946). An ideal type is an analytical construct that
serves as a measuring rod for social observers to determine the extent
to which concrete social institutions are similar and how they differ from
some defined measure (Aron,
1970; Coser,
1977).
The
ideal type involves determining the features of a social institution that
would be present if the institution were a logically consistent whole,
not affected by other institutions, concerns and interests. "As general
concepts, ideal types are tools with which Weber prepares the descriptive
materials of world history for comparative analysis" (Gerth
and Mills, 1946: 60). The ideal type never corresponds to concrete
reality but is a description to which we can compare reality. "Ideal Capitalism,"
for example, is used extensively in social science literature. According
to the ideal type, capitalism consists of four basic features:
Private
Ownership of all potentially profitable activity
Pursuit
of Profit
Competition
between companies
Laissez
Faire, or government keeps its hands off the economy
In reality,
all capitalist systems deviate from the theoretical construct we call "ideal
capitalism." Even the U.S., often considered the most capitalistic nation
on earth, strays measurably from the ideal. For example, federal,
state and local governments do operate some potentially profitable activities
(parks, power companies, and the Post Office come to mind). Many
markets in the U.S. are not very competitive, being dominated by large
monopolies or oligopolies (and here, the list is endless). Finally,
various levels of government do, occasionally, regulate the economy.
Still, the ideal construct of capitalism allows us to compare and contrast
the economic systems of various societies to this definition, or compare
the American economy to itself over time.
Bureaucracy
Weber's
focus on the trend of rationalization led him to concern himself with the
operation and expansion of large-scale enterprises in both the public and
private sectors of modern societies (Aron,
1970; Coser,
1977). Bureaucracy can be considered to be a particular case
of rationalization, or rationalization applied to human organization. Bureaucratic
coordination of human action, Weber believed, is the distinctive mark of
modern social structures. In order to study these organizations, both historically
and in contemporary society, Weber developed the characteristics of an
ideal-type bureaucracy:
Hierarchy
of authority
Impersonality
Written
rules of conduct
Promotion
based on achievement
Specialized
division of labor
Efficiency
According
to Weber, bureaucracies are goal-oriented organizations designed according
to rational principles in order to efficiently attain their goals. Offices
are ranked in a hierarchical order, with information flowing up the chain
of command, directives flowing down. Operations of the organizations
are characterized by impersonal rules that explicitly
state duties, responsibilities, standardized procedures and conduct of
office holders. Offices are highly specialized . Appointments to
these offices are made according to specialized qualifications rather than
ascribed criteria. All of these ideal characteristics have one goal,
to promote the efficient attainment of the organization's goals (Aron,
1970; Coser,
1977).
Some
have seriously misinterpreted Weber and have claimed that he liked bureaucracy,
that he believed that bureaucracy was an "ideal" organization. Others
have pronounced Weber "wrong" because bureaucracies do not live up to his
list of "ideals." Others have even claimed that Weber "invented"
bureaucratic organization. But Weber described bureaucracy as an "ideal
type" in order to more accurately describe their growth in power and scope
in the modern world. His studies of bureaucracy still form the core
of organizational sociology.
The
bureaucratic coordination of the action of large numbers of people has
become the dominant structural feature of modern societies. It is
only through this organizational device that large-scale planning and coordination,
both for the modern state and the modern economy, become possible.
The consequences of the growth in the power and scope of these organizations
is key in understanding our world.
Authority
Weber's
discussion of authority relations also provides insight into what is happening
in the modern world. On what basis do men and women claim authority
over others? Why do men and women give obedience to authority figures?
Again, he uses the ideal type to begin to address these questions. Weber
distinguished three main types of authority:
Traditional
Authority
Rational-legal
Authority
Charismatic
Rational
legal authority is anchored in impersonal rules that have been legally
established. This type of authority (which parallels the growth of zweckrational)
has come to characterize social relations in modern societies (Aron,
1970; Coser,
1977). Traditional authority often dominates pre-modern societies.
It is based on the belief in the sanctity of tradition, of "the eternal
yesterday" (Aron,
1970; Coser,
1977). Because of the shift in human motivation, it is often
difficult for modern students to conceive of the hold that tradition has
in pre-modern societies.
Unlike rational-legal authority, traditional authority is not codified
in impersonal rules but is usually invested in a hereditary line or invested
in a particular office by a higher power (Coser,
1977). Finally, charismatic authority rests on the appeal of
leaders who claim allegiance because of the force of their extraordinary
personalities.
Again,
it should be kept in mind that Weber is describing an ideal type; he was
aware that in empirical reality mixtures will be found in the legitimization
of authority (Coser, 1977). The appeal of Jesus
Christ, for example, one of the most important charismatics in history,
was partly based on tradition as well.
Causality
Weber
firmly believed in the multi-causality of social phenomenon. He expressed
this causality in terms of probabilities (Aron,
1970;Gerth and Mills, 1946; Coser,
1977). Weber's notion of probability derives from his recognition
of the system character of human societies and therefore the impossibility
of making exhaustive predictions. Prediction becomes possible, Weber
believed, only within a system of theory that focus our concern on a few
social forces out of the wealth of forces and their interactions that make
up empirical reality (Freund, 1968: 7-9).
Within such constraints, causal certainty in social research is not attainable
(nor is it attainable outside the laboratory in natural sciences).
The best that can be done is to focus our theories on the most important
relationships between social forces, and to forecast from that theory in
terms of probabilities.
In
this connection, it is often said that Weber was in a running dialogue
with the ghost of Karl Marx. But contrary to many interpretations,
Weber was not attempting to refute Marx, he was very respectful of Marx's
contributions to understanding human societies. But he did disagree
with Marx's assertion of the absolute primacy of material conditions in
determining human behavior (Aron, 1970;Gerth
and Mills, 1946; Coser, 1977). Weber's
system invokes both ideas and material factors as interactive components
in the sociocultural evolutionary process. "He was most respectful
of Marx's contributions, yet believed, in tune with his own methodology,
that that Marx had unduly emphasized one particular causal chain, the one
leading from the economic infrastructure to the cultural superstructure"
(Coser, 1977: 228). This, Weber believed,
could not adequately take into account the complex web of causation linking
social structures and ideas.
Weber
attempted to show that the relations between ideas and social structures
were multiple and varied, and that causal connections went in both directions.
While Weber basically agreed with Marx that economic factors were key in
understanding the social system, he gave much greater emphasis to the influence
and interaction of ideas and values on sociocultural evolution (Aron,
1970;Coser, 1977).
Gerth
and Mills (1946) summarize Weber's posited relationship between material
conditions and ideas in the following passage:
There
is no pre-established correspondence between the content of an idea and
the interests of those who follow from the first hour. But, in time,
ideas are discredited in the face of history unless they point in the direction
of conduct that various interests promote. Ideas, selected and reinterpreted
from the original doctrine, do gain an affinity with the interests of certain
members of special strata; if they do not gain such an affinity, they are
abandoned (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 63).
It is
in this light that the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism must
be read.
The Protestant
Ethic
Weber's
concern with the meaning that people give to their actions allowed him
to understand the drift of historical change. He believed that rational
action within a system of rational-legal authority is at the heart of modern
society. His sociology was first and foremost an attempt to explore
and explain this shift from traditional to rational action (Aron,
1970). What was it about the West, he asks, that is causing this shift?
In an effort to understand these causes, Weber examined the religious and
economic systems of many civilizations.
Weber
came to believe that the rationalization of action can only be realized
when traditional ways of life are abandoned (Coser,
1977). Because of its erosion, modern people may have a difficult
time realizing the hold of tradition over pre-industrial peoples.
Weber's task was to uncover the forces in the West that caused people to
abandon their traditional religious value orientation and encouraged them
to develop a desire for acquiring goods and wealth (Aron,
1970;Coser, 1977).
After
careful study, Weber came to the hypothesis that the protestant ethic broke
the hold of tradition while it encouraged men to apply themselves rationally
to their work (Gerth and Mills, 1946).
Calvinism, he found, had developed a set of beliefs around the concept
of predestination. It was believed by followers of Calvin that one
could not do good works or perform acts of faith to assure your place in
heaven. You were either among the "elect" (in which case you were
in) or you were not. However, wealth was taken as a sign (by you
and your neighbors) that you were one of the God's elect, thereby providing
encouragement for people to acquire wealth. The protestant ethic
therefore provided religious sanctions that fostered a spirit of rigorous
discipline, encouraging men to apply themselves rationally to acquire wealth
(Aron, 1970;Coser,
1977).
Weber
studied non-Western cultures as well. He found that several of these
pre-industrial societies had the technological infrastructure and other
necessary preconditions to begin capitalism and economic expansion, however,
capitalism failed to emerge (Gerth and Mills, 1946:
61). The only force missing were the positive sanctions to abandon
traditional ways. "By such a comparative analysis of causal sequences,
Weber tried to find not only the necessary but the sufficient conditions
of capitalism" (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 61).
While Weber does not believe that the protestant ethic was the only cause
of the rise of capitalism, he believed it to be a powerful force in fostering
its emergence (Aron, 1970; Coser,
1977; Gerth and Mills, 1946).
Oligarchy
Weber
noted the dysfunctions of bureaucracy in terms of the impact that it had
on individuals. Its major advantage, efficiency in attaining goals, makes
it unwieldy in dealing with individual cases. The impersonality, so important
in attaining efficiency of the organization, is dehumanizing. But the concern
over bureaucracy's threat to the members of a particular organization has
served to overshadow its effects on the larger society. Weber was
very concerned about the impact that rationalization and bureaucratization
had on sociocultural systems.
By
its very nature bureaucracy generates an enormous degree of unregulated
and often unperceived social power. Because of bureaucracy's superiority
over other forms of organization, they have proliferated and now dominate
modern societies. Those who control these organizations, Weber warned,
control the quality of our life, and they are largely self-appointed leaders.
Bureaucracy
tends to result in oligarchy, or rule by the few officials at the top of
the organization. In a society dominated by large formal organizations,
there is a danger that social, political and economic power will become
concentrated in the hands of the few who hold high positions in the most
influential of these organizations.
The
issue was first raised by Weber, but it was more fully explored by Robert
Michels a sociologist and friend of Weber's. Michels
(1915) was a socialist and was disturbed to find that the socialist
parties of Europe, despite their democratic ideology and provisions for
mass participation, seemed to be dominated by their leaders, just as the
traditional conservative parties. He came to the conclusion that the problem
lay in the very nature of organizations. He formulated the 'Iron
Law of Oligarchy': "Who says organization, says oligarchy."
According
to the "iron law" democracy and large scale organization are incompatible.
Any large organization, Michels pointed out,
is faced with problems of coordination that can be solved only by creating
a bureaucracy. A bureaucracy, by design, is hierarchically organized
to achieve efficiency--many decisions that have to be made every day cannot
be made by large numbers of people in an efficient manner. The effective
functioning of an organization therefore requires the concentration of
much power in the hands of a few people.
The
organizational characteristics that promote oligarchy are reinforced by
certain characteristics of both leaders and members of organizations.
People achieve leadership positions precisely because they have unusual
political skill; they are adept at getting their way and persuading others
of the correctness of their views. Once they hold high office, their
power and prestige is further increased. Leaders have access and
control over information and facilities that are not available to the rank-and-file.
They control the information that flows down the channels of communication.
Leaders are also strongly motivated to persuade the organization of the
rightness of their views, and they use all of their skills, power and authority
to do so.
By
design of the organization, rank and file are less informed than their
"superiors." Finally, from birth, we are taught to obey those in positions
of authority. Therefore, the rank and file tend to look to the leaders
for policy directives and are generally prepared to allow leaders to exercise
their judgment on most matters.
Leaders
also have control over very powerful negative and positive sanctions to
promote the behavior that they desire. They have the power to grant
or deny raises, assign workloads, fire, demote and that most gratifying
of all sanctions, the power to promote. Most important, they tend
to promote junior officials who share their opinions, with the result that
the oligarchy become a self-perpetuating one. Therefore, the very nature
of large scale organization makes oligarchy within these organizations
inevitable. Bureaucracy, by design, promotes the centralization of power
in the hands of those at the top of the organization.
Societal
Oligarchy
While
it is easy to see oligarchy within formal organizations, Weber's views
on the inevitability of oligarchy within whole societies are a little more
subtle. The social structure of modern society has become dominated
by bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are necessary to provide the coordination
and control so desperately needed by our complex society (and huge populations).
But while modern societies are dependent on formal organization, bureaucracy
tends to undermine both human freedom and democracy in the long-run.
While government departments are theoretically responsible to the electorate,
this responsibility is almost entirely fictional. It often happens,
in fact, that the electorate (and even the congress) do not even know what
these bureaucracies are doing. Government departments have grown
so numerous, so complex, that they cannot be supervised effectively.
The
modern era is one of interest-group politics, in which the degree of participation
of the ordinary citizen in the forging of political positions is strictly
limited. Our impact on political decision making depends, to a large
extent, on our membership in organizational structures. The power
of these groups, in turn, depend in large part on such organizational characteristics
as size of membership; and commitment of membership to the goals of the
organization; and wealth of the organization. But it is through organization
that we lose control of the decision making process.
Those
on top of bureaucratic hierarchies can command vast resources in pursuit
of their interests. This power is often unseen and unregulated, which gives
the elite at the top of these hierarchies vast social, economic, and political
power. The problem is further compounded by huge corporations, economic
bureaucracies that have tremendous impact over our lives, an impact over
which we have little control. Our control over corporations is hardly
even fictional any longer. Not only do these economic bureaucracies
affect us directly, they also affect our governments--organizations supposedly
designed to regulate them.
To
quote Peter Blau on this topic: "The most pervasive feature that
distinguishes contemporary life is that it is dominated by large, complex,
and formal organizations. Our ability to organize thousands and even millions
of men in order to accomplish large-scale tasks--be they economic, political,
or military--is one of our greatest strengths. The possibility that
free men become mere cogs in the bureaucratic machines we set up for this
purpose is one of the greatest threats to our liberty."
Rationalization
The rationalization
process is the practical application of knowledge to achieve a desired
end. It leads to efficiency, coordination, and control over both
the physical and the social environment. It is a product of "scientific
specialization and technical differentiation" that seems to be a characteristic
of Western culture (Freund, 1968). It
is the guiding principle behind bureaucracy and the increasing division
of labor. It has led to the unprecedented increase in both the production
and distribution of goods and services. It is also associated with
secularization, depersonalization, and oppressive routine. Increasingly,
human behavior is guided by observation, experiment and reason (zweckrational)
to master the natural and social environment to achieve a desired
end (Elwell, 1999).
Freund
(1968: 18) defines it as "the organization of life through a division
and coordination of activities on the basis of exact study of men's relations
with each other, with their tools and their envionmnet, for the purpose
of achieving greater efficiency and productivity." Weber's general theory
of rationalization (of which bureaucratization is but a particular case)
refers to increasing human mastery over the natural and social environment.
In turn, these changes in social structure have changed human character
through changing values, philosophies, and beliefs. Such superstructural
norms and values as individualism, efficiency, self-discipline, materialism,
and calculability (all of which are subsumed under Weber's concept of zweckrational)
have been encouraged by the bureaucratization process.
Bureaucracy
and rationalization were rapidly replacing all other forms of organization
and thought. They formed a stranglehold on all sectors of Western society:
It
is horrible to think that the world could one day be filled with nothing
but those little cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving
toward bigger ones--a state of affairs which is to be seen once more, as
in the Egyptian records, playing an ever increasing part in the spirit
of our present administrative systems, and especially of its offspring,
the students. This passion for bureaucracy ...is enough to drive one to
despair. It is as if in politics. . . we were to deliberately to become
men who need "order" and nothing but order, become nervous and cowardly
if for one moment this order wavers, and helpless if they are torn away
from their total incorporation in it. That the world should know no men
but these: it is in such an evolution that we are already caught up, and
the great question is, therefore, not how we can promote and hasten it,
but what can we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of
mankind free from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery
of the bureaucratic way of life.
Rationalization
is the most general element of Weber's theory. He identifies rationalization
with an increasing division of labor, bureaucracy and mechanization (Gerth
and Mills, 1946). He associates it with depersonalization, oppressive
routine, rising secularism, as well as being destructive of individual
freedom (Gerth and Mills, 1946;Freund,
1968) .
The Irrationality
Factor
Since
it is clear that modern societies are so pervasively dominated by bureaucracy
it is crucial to understand why this enormous power is often used for ends
that are counter to the interests and needs of people (Elwell,
1999). Why is it that "as rationalization increases, the irrational
grows in intensity"? (Freund, 1968: 25).
Again, the rationalization process is the increasing dominance of zweckrational
action over rational action based on values, or actions motivated by traditions
and emotions. Zweckrational can best be understood as "technocratic
thinking," in which the goal is simply to find the most efficient means
to whatever ends are defined as important by those in power.
Technocratic
thinking can be contrasted with wertrational, which involves the assessment
of goals and means in terms of ultimate human values such as social justice,
peace, and human happiness. Weber maintained that even though a bureaucracy
is highly rational in the formal sense of technical efficiency, it does
not follow that it is also rational in the sense of the moral acceptability
of its goals or the means used to achieve them. Nor does an exclusive focus
on the goals of the organization necessarily coincide with the broader
goals of society as a whole. It often happens that the single-minded pursuit
of practical goals can actually undermine the foundations of the social
order (Elwell, 1999). What is good for the
bureaucracy is not always good for the society as a whole--and often, in
the long term, is not good for the bureaucracy either.
In
a chapter entitled "How Moral Men Make Immoral Decisions," John De Lorean
a former General Motors executive (and famous for many things) muses over
business morality. "It seemed to me, and still does, that the system
of American business often produces wrong, immoral and irresponsible decisions,
even though the personal morality of the people running the business is
often above reproach. The system has a different morality as a group than
the people do as individuals, which permits it to willfully produce ineffective
or dangerous products, deal dictatorially and often unfairly with suppliers,
pay bribes for business, abrogate the rights of employees by demanding
blind loyalty to management or tamper with the democratic process of government
through illegal political contributions" (J.
Wright, 1979: 61-62). De Lorean goes on to speculate that this
immorality is connected to the impersonal character of business organization.
Morality, John says, has to do with people. "If an action is viewed primarily
from the perspective of its effect on people, it is put into the moral
realm. . . .Never once while I was in General Motors management did I hear
substantial social concern raised about the impact of our business on America,
its consumers or the economy" (J. Wright, 1979:
62-63).
One
of the most well-documented cases of the irrationality factor in business
concerns the Chevrolet Corvair (Watergate, the IRS, the Post Office, recent
elections, and the Department of Defense provide plenty of government examples).
Introduced to the American Market in 1960, several compromises between
the original design and what management ultimately approved were made for
financial reasons. "Tire diameter was cut, the aluminum engine was modified,
the plush interior was downgraded and a $15 stabilizing bar was deleted
from the suspension system" (R. Wright, 1996).
As a result, a couple of the prototypes rolled over on the test tracks
and it quickly became apparent that GM had a problem (J.
Wright, 1979; R. Wright, 1996).
De Lorean again takes up the story.
At
the very least, then, within General Motors in the late 1950s, serious
questions were raised about the Corvair's safety. At the very most,
there was a mountain of documented evidence that the car should not be
built as it was then designed. . . .The results were disastrous.
I don't think any one car before or since produced as gruesome a record
on the highway as the Corvair. It was designed and promoted to appeal to
the spirit and flair of young people. It was sold in part as a sports car.
Young Corvair owners, therefore, were trying to bend their car around curves
at high speeds and were killing themselves in alarming numbers
(J. Wright, 1979: 65-66).
The denial
and cover-up led the corporation to ignore the evidence, even as the number
of lawsuits mounted--even as the sons and daughters of executives of the
corporation were seriously injured or killed (J.
Wright, 1979). When Ralph Nader (1965)
published his book that detailed the Corvair's problems,
Unsafe at Any
Speed, the response of GM was to assign a private detective to follow
him so as to gather information to attack him personally rather than debate
his facts and assertions (Halberstam, 1986;
J.
Wright, 1979; R. Wright, 1996). Internal
documents were destroyed, and pressure was put on executives and engineers
alike to be team players (J. Wright, 1979).
De Lorean summarizes the irrational character of the bureaucracy's decision
making process:
There
wasn't a man in top GM management who had anything to do with the Corvair
who would purposely build a car that he knew would hurt or kill people.
But, as part of a management team pushing for increased sales and profits,
each gave his individual approval in a group to decisions which produced
the car in the face of the serious doubts that were raised about its safety,
and then later sought to squelch information which might prove the car's
deficiencies (J. Wright, 1979: 65-68).
The result
was that despite the existence of many moral men within the organization,
many immoral decisions were made.
An
extreme case of rationalization was the extermination camps of Nazi Germany.
The goal was to kill as many people as possible in the most efficient manner,
and the result was the ultimate of dehumanization--the murder of millions
of men, women and children. The men and women who ran the extermination
camps were, in large part, ordinary human beings. They were not particularly
evil people. Most went to church on Sundays; most had children, loved
animals and life. William Shirer (1960)
comments on business firms that collaborated in the building and running
of the camps: "There had been, the records show, some lively competition
among German businessmen to procure orders for building these death and
disposal contraptions and for furnishing the lethal blue crystals.
The firm of I. A. Topf and Sons of Erfurt, manufacturers of heating equipment,
won out in its bid for the crematoria at Auschwitz. The story of
its business enterprise was revealed in a voluminous correspondence found
in the records of the camp. A letter from the firm dated February
12, 1943, gives the tenor:
To:
The Central Construction Office of the S.S. and Police, Auschwitz
Subject:
Crematoria 2 and 3 for the camp.
We
acknowledge receipt of your order for five triple furnaces, including two
electric elevators for raising corpses and one emergency elevator. A
practical installation for stoking coal was also ordered and one for transporting
ashes (Shirer, 1960: 971).
The
“lethal blue crystals” of Zyklon-B used in the gas chambers were supplied
by two German firms which had acquired the patent from I. G. Farben (Shirer,
1960). Their product could do the most effective job for the
least possible cost, so they got the contract. Shirer
(1960) summarizes the organization of evil. “Before the postwar
trials in Germany it had been generally believed that the mass killings
were exclusively the work of a relatively few fanatical S.S. leaders.
But the records of the courts leave no doubt of the complicity of a number
of German businessmen, not only the Krupps and the directors of I.G. Farben
chemical trust but smaller entrepreneurs who outwardly must have seemed
to be the most prosaic and decent of men, pillars--like good businessmen
everywhere--of their communities” (972-973). In sum, the extermination
camps and their suppliers were models of bureaucratic efficiency using
the most efficient means available at that time to accomplish the goals
of the Nazi government.
But
German corporations went beyond supplying the government with the machinery
of death, some actively participated in the killing process. "This
should occasion neither surprise nor shock. I.G. Farben was one of
the first great corporate conglomerates. Its executives merely carried
the logic of corporate rationality to its ultimate conclusion...the perfect
labor force for a corporation that seeks fully to minimize costs and maximize
profits is slave labor in a death camp. Among the great German corporations
who utilized slave labor were AEG (German General Electric), Wanderer-Autounion
(Audi), Krupp, Rheinmetall Borsig, Siemens-Schuckert and Telefunken"
(Rubenstein, 1975: 58).
I.G.
Farben's synthetic rubber (Buna) plants at Auschwitz are a good example
of the relationship between corporate profits and Nazi goals. I.G.
Farben's investment in the plant at Auschwitz was considerable--over $1,000,000,000
in 1970s American dollars. The construction work required 170 contractors
and subcontractors, housing had to be built for the corporate personnel,
barracks for the workers. SS guards supplied by the state would administer
punishment when rules were broken. The workers at the plants were treated
as all other inmates in the camp. The only exception was one of diet, workers
in the plants would receive an extra ration of "Buna soup" to maintain
"a precisely calculated level of productivity" (Rubenstein,
1975: 58). Nor was any of this hidden from corporate executives;
they were full participants in the horror. With an almost inexhaustible
supply of workers, the corporation simply worked their slave laborers to
death.
The
fact that individual officials have specialized and limited responsibility
and authority within the organization means that they are unlikely to raise
basic questions regarding the moral implications of the overall operation
of the organization. Under
the rule of specialization, society becomes more and more intricate and
interdependent, but with less common purpose. The community disintegrates
because it loses its common bond. The emphasis in bureaucracies is on getting
the job done in the most efficient manner possible. Consideration of what
impact organizational behavior might have on society as a whole, on the
environment, or on the consumer simply does not enter into the calculation.
The
problem is further compounded by the decline of many traditional institutions
such as the family, community, and religion, which served to bind pre-industrial
man to the interests of the group. Rationalization causes the weakening
of traditional and religious moral authority (secularization); the values
of efficiency and calculability predominate. In an advanced industrial-bureaucratic
society, everything becomes a component of the expanding machine, including
human beings (Elwell, 1999). C.
Wright Mills, whose social theory was strongly influenced by Weber,
describes the problem:
It
is not the number of victims or the degree of cruelty that is distinctive;
it is the fact that the acts committed and the acts that nobody protests
are split from the consciousness of men in an uncanny, even a schizophrenic
manner. The atrocities of our time are done by men as "functions"
of social machinery--men possessed by an abstracted view that hides from
them the human beings who are their victims and, as well, their own humanity.
They are inhuman acts because they are impersonal. They are not sadistic
but merely businesslike; they are not aggressive but merely efficient;
they are not emotional at all but technically clean-cut (C.
Wright Mills, 1958: 83-84).
The result
is a seeming paradox-- bureaucracies, the epitome of rationalization, acting
in very irrational ways. Thus we have economic bureaucracies in pursuit
of profit that deplete and pollute the environment upon which they are
based; political bureaucracies, set up to protect our civil liberties,
that violate them with impunity; Agricultural bureaucracies
(educational, government, and business) set up to help the farmer, that
end up putting millions of these same farmers out of business; Service
bureaucracies designed to care for and protect the elderly, that routinely
deny service and actually engage in abuse. The irrationality of bureaucratic
institutions is a major factor in understanding contemporary society. Weber
called this formal rationalization as opposed to substantive rationality
(the ability to anchor actions in the consideration of the whole). It can
also be called the irrationality of rationalization, or more generally,
the irrationality factor (Elwell, 1999). The
irrationality of bureaucratic institutions is a major factor is understanding
contemporary society.
Weber
and Marx
Weber
believed that Marxist theory was too simplistic, reducing all to a single
economic cause (Gerth and Mills, 1946). However,
Weber does not attempt to refute Marx, rather he can be interpreted as
an attempt to round out Marx's economic determinism (Gerth
and Mills, 1946).
"Weber's
views about the inescapable rationalization and bureaucratization of the
world have some obvious similarities to Marx's notion of alienation.
Both men agree that modern methods of organization have tremendously increased
the effectiveness and efficiency of production and organization and have
allowed an unprecedented domination of man over the world of nature. They
also agree that the new world of rationalized efficiency has turned into
a monster that threatens to dehumanize its creators. But Weber disagrees
with Marx's claim that alienation is only a transitional stage on the road
to man's true emancipation" (Coser, 1977: 232).
Weber
believed that the alienation documented by Marx had little to do with the
ownership of the mode of production, but was a consequence of bureaucracy
and the rationalization of social life.
Marx asserted that capitalism has led to the "expropriation" of the worker
from the mode of production. He believed that the modern worker is
not in control of his fate, is forced to sell his labor (and thus his self)
to private capitalists. Weber countered that loss of control at work was
an inescapable result of any system of rationally coordinated production
(Coser, 1977). Weber argued that men could
no longer engage in socially significant action unless they joined a large-scale
organization. In joining organizations they would have to sacrifice their
personal desires and goals to the impersonal goals and procedures of the
organization itself (Coser, 1977). By
doing so, they would be cut off from a part of themselves, they would become
alienated.
Socialism
and capitalism are both economic systems based on industrialization--the
rational application of science, observation, and reason to the production
of goods and services. Both capitalism and socialism are forms of
a rational organization of economic life to control and coordinate this
production. Socialism is predicated on government ownership of the economy
to provide the coordination to meet the needs of people within society.
If anything, Weber maintained, socialism would be even more rationalized,
even more bureaucratic than capitalism. And thus, more alienating
to human beings as well (Gerth and Mills, 1946:
49).
Sociocultural Evolution
According
to Weber, because bureaucracy is a form of organization superior to all
others, further bureaucratization and rationalization may be an inescapable
fate. "Without this form of (social) technology the industrialized countries
could not have reached the heights of extravagance and wealth that they
currently enjoy. All indications are that they will continue to grow in
size and scope." Weber wrote of the evolution of an iron cage, a
technically ordered, rigid, dehumanized society:
"It
is apparent that today we are proceeding towards an evolution which resembles
(the ancient kingdom of Egypt) in every detail, except that it is built
on other foundations, on technically more perfect, more rationalized, and
therefore much more mechanized foundations. The problem which besets
us now is not: how can this evolution be changed?--for that is impossible,
but: what will come of it." Weber feared that our probable future would
be even more bureaucratized, an iron cage that limits individual human
potential rather than a technological utopia that sets us free (Aron,
1970;Coser, 1977).
It
is perhaps fitting to close with a quote from Max engaged in speculation
on the other future possibilities of industrial systems. While Weber had
a foreboding of an "iron cage" of bureaucracy and rationality, he recognized
that human beings are not mere subjects molded by sociocultural forces.
We are both creatures and creators of sociocultural systems. And even in
a sociocultural system that increasingly institutionalizes and rewards
goal oriented rational behavior in pursuit of wealth and material symbols
of status there are other possibilities:
"No
one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end
of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there
will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals or, if neither, mechanized
petrification embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For
of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly
said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity
imagines that it has obtained a level of civilization never before achieved"
(Weber, 1904/1930: 181).
In
his own words:
On
sociology:
"Sociology
. . . is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding
of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and
consequences. We shall speak of 'action' insofar as the acting individual
attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior--be it overt or covert, omission
or acquiescence. Action is 'social' insofar as its subjective meaning
takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its
course" (1921/1968, p.4).
"Within
the realm of social conduct one finds factual regularities, that is, courses
of action which, with a typically identical meaning, are repeated by the
actors or simultaneously occur among numerous actors. It is with
such types of conduct that sociology is concerned, in contrast to history,
which is interested in the causal connections of important, i.e., fateful,
single events (1921/1968).
"An
ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points
of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or
less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which
are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into
a unified analytical construct. . . . In its conceptual purity, this mental
construct . . . cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality" (1903-1917/1949,
p. 90).
On
materialism and ideationalism:
"We have
no intention whatever of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis
as that the spirit of capitalism . . . could only have arisen as the result
of certain effects of the Reformation, or even that capitalism as an economic
system is a creation of the Reformation. . . . On the contrary, we only
wish to ascertain whether and to what extent religious forces have taken
part in the qualitative formation and the quantitative expansion of that
spirit over the world" (1904/1930, p. 91).
"In
view of the tremendous confusion of interdependent influences between the
material basis, the forms of social and political organization, and the
ideas current in the time of the Reformation, we can only proceed by investigating
whether and at what points certain correlations between forms of religious
belief and practical ethics can be worked out" (1904/1930,
p. 91).
"Not
ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct.
Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas'
have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been
pushed by the dynamic of interest" (1946/1958,
p. 280).
On
the protestant ethic:
"A man
does not 'by nature' wish to earn more and more money, but simply to live
as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much as is necessary for that
purpose. Wherever modern capitalism has begun its work of increasing
the productivity of human labour by increasing its intensity, it has encountered
the immensely stubborn resistance of this leading trait of pre-capitalistic
labour" (1904/1930, p. 60).
[For
the Calvinist] "The world exists to serve the glorification of God and
for that purpose alone. The elected Christian is in the world only to increase
this glory of god by fulfilling His commandments to the best of his ability.
But God requires social achievement of the Christian because He will that
social life shall be organized according to His commandments, in accordance
with that purpose" (1904/1930, p. 108).
"Waste
of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins.
The span of human life is infinitely short and precious to make sure of
one's own election. Loss of time through sociability, idle talk,
luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for health. . . .is worthy of
absolute moral condemnation. . . .[Time] is infinitely valuable because
every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God. Thus inactive
contemplation is also valueless, or even directly reprehensible if it is
at the expense of one's daily work. For it is less pleasing to God than
the active performance of His will in a calling" (1904/1930,
pp. 157-158).
"The
religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly
calling, as the highest means of asceticism, and at the same time the surest
and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the
most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of . . . the spirit of
capitalism" (1946/1958: 172).
"Capitalism
is today an immense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which
presents itself to him, at least as an individual, in so far as he is involved
in the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalist rules of
action" (1904/1930, p. 54).
On
rationalization:
"The great
historic process in the development of religions, the elimination of magic
from the world which had begun with the old Hebrew prophets and, in conjunction
with Hellenistic scientific thought, had repudiated all magical means to
salvation as superstition and sin, came here to its logical conclusion.
The genuine Puritan even rejected all signs of religious ceremony at the
grave and buried his nearest and dearest without song or ritual in order
that no superstition, no trust in the effects of magical and sacramental
forces on salvation, should creep in" (1904/1930,
p. 105).
"This
whole process of rationalization in the factory and elsewhere, and especially
in the bureaucratic state machine, parallels the centralization of the
material implements of organization in the hands of the master. Thus,
discipline inexorably takes over ever larger areas as the satisfaction
of political and economic needs is increasingly rationalized. This
universal phenomenon more and more restricts the importance of charisma
and of individually differentiated conduct" (1921/1968,
p. 1156).
On
bureaucracy:
"From
a purely technical point of view, a bureaucracy is capable of attaining
the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the most
rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It
is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency
of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible
a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of
the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally
superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations
and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks
(1921/1968, p. 223).
"The
principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a
firmly ordered system of supe- and subordination in which there is a supervision
of the lower offices by the higher ones" (1946/1958,
p. 197)
"No
machinery in the world functions so precisely as this apparatus of men
and, moreover, so cheaply. . .. Rational calculation . . . reduces every
worker to a cog in this bureaucratic machine and, seeing himself in this
light, he will merely ask how to transform himself into a somewhat bigger
cog. . . . The passion for bureaucratization drives us to despair" (1921/1968:
liii).
"The
needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable.
The choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of
administration" (1921/1968, p. 224).
"When
those subject to bureaucratic control seek to escape the influence of existing
bureaucratic apparatus, this is normally possible only by creating an organization
of their own which is equally subject to the process of bureaucratization"
(1921/1968, p. 224).
[Socialism]
"would mean a tremendous increase in the importance of professional bureaucrats"
(1921/1968, p. 224).
"Not
summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness
and hardness, no matter which group may triumph externally now" (1946/1958,
p. 128).
"To
this extent increasing bureaucratization is a function of the increasing
possession of goods used for consumption, and of an increasingly sophisticated
technique for fashioning external life--a technique which corresponds to
the opportunities provided by such wealth" (1946/1958,
p. 212).
"It
is horrible to think that the world could one day be filled with nothing
but those little cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving
toward bigger ones--a state of affairs which is to be seen once more, as
in the Egyptian records, playing an ever increasing part in the spirit
of our present administrative systems, and especially of its offspring,
the students. This passion for bureaucracy ...is enough to drive one to
despair. It is as if in politics. . . we were to deliberately to become
men who need "order" and nothing but order, become nervous and cowardly
if for one moment this order wavers, and helpless if they are torn away
from their total incorporation in it. That the world should know no men
but these: it is in such an evolution that we are already caught up, and
the great question is, therefore, not how we can promote and hasten it,
but what can we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of
mankind free from this parceling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery
of the bureaucratic way of life."
"The
state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of force within a given territory"(1946/1958,
p. 78).
"When
fully developed, bureaucracy stands . . . under the principle of sine ira
ac studio (without scorn and bias). Its specific nature which is
welcomed by capitalism develops the more perfectly the more bureaucracy
is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from offcial
business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional
elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of
bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue" (1946/1958,
pp. 215-16).
"The
decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always
been its purely technical superiortiy over any other kind of organization.
The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations
exactly as does the machine with the nonmechanical modes of organization"
(1946/1958, p. 214).
"Precision,
speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity,
strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal
costs--these are raised tothe optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic
organization" (1946/1958, p. 214).
"The
appartus (bureaucracy), with its peculiar impersonal character. . . is
easily made to work for anybody who knows how to gain control over it.
A rationally ordered system of officials continues to function smoothly
after the enemy has occupied the area: he merely needs to change the top
officials" (1946/1958, p. 229)
On
social evolution:
"It is
apparent that today we are proceeding towards an evolution which resembles
(the ancient kingdom of Egypt) in every detail, except that it is built
on other foundations, on technically more perfect, more rationalized, and
therefore much more mechanized foundations. The problem which besets
us now is not: how can this evolution be changed?--for that is impossible,
but: what will come of it."
"Since
asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in
the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable
power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today
the spirit of religious asceticism--whether finally, who knows?--has escaped
from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical
foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing
heir, the Enlightenment, also seems to be irretrievably fading, and the
idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost
of dead religious beliefs (1904/1930, pp.181-182).
"In
the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit
of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become
associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the
character of sport (1904/1930, p. 182).
"No
one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end
of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there
will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals or, if neither, mechanized
petrification embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For
of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly
said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity
imagines that it has obtained a level of civilization never before achieved'"
(1904/1930, p. 182).
Referencing
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Verstehen: Max Weber's HomePage
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Elwell, Frank, 1996, The
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